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he present paper deals with the discourse of the rights of Muslim women in 
the pre- independence period with particular reference to the Shariat Act 
1937 and the Muslim Marriage Dissolution Act 1939. We try to raise a few 
questions which would provide a comprehensive idea of the intentions behind 
these enactments. What is meant by the Shariat? What was the position of women 
before these Acts were passed? Why was a need for these enactments felt by the 
community, national leaders, reformers, as well as the British rulers? Was issue of 
gender justice the focus for the demanding these enactments by the community 
leaders and the political parties? What were the overall political circumstances in 
which these enactments were brought? This paper attempts to explore the socio-
historical and political situation in which these Acts were passed. To this end, we 
have tried to capture various debates that took place among the legislators in the 
assembly, social reformers, writers, community leaders and so on. The role of 
political parties, women’s organizations and the women’s movement is also taken 
into account in dealing with the above issue.  The paper is based on information 
collected from primary and secondary sources, and analysis is socio-historical in 
nature. 
 
Origin of Muslim Law 
 
Before discussing the Muslim personal law, we would like to define the term law. 
There are two different conceptions of law: as divine and as man-made. The latter 
notion is the guiding principle of all modern legislation. Law, according to a modern 
Jurist, is the ‘distilled essence of the civilization of a people, it reflects the people’s 
soul more clearly than of any other organism. As far as the literal meaning of 
Shariat goes, it is considered as ‘the road to the watering place, the path to be 
followed. However, the technical meaning of Shariat is the Canon law of Islam, the 
totality of Allah’s commandments, and is the central core of Islam, while 
jurisprudential law is called Fiqh. Therefore, fundamentally, Shariat is a Doctrine 
of Duties, a code of obligations in which legal considerations and individual rights 
T 
 2 
are given a secondary place.  In other words, as pointed out by Mr Justice 
Mahmood, ‘It is to be remembered that Mohammadan law is so intimately 
connected with religion that they can not readily be dissevered from it’(Fyzee 
1974;15).  
Mohammdan law came into existence through the working  of Muhammedan 
jurisprudence on the raw material which consisted of the popular and the 
administrative practice of late Umayyad time and was endorsed, modified or 
rejected by the earliest lawyers. These lawyers and their successors were guided by 
a double aim namely by the effort to systematize and by the tendency to ‘Islamize’ , 
to impregnate the sphere of law with religious and ethical ideas, to subject it to 
Islamic norms, and to incorporate it in the body of duties incumbent on every 
Muslim (ibid.30). 
Right from the days of the East India Company, the English courts assumed 
the authority to decide disputes between natives. For this purpose, several 
scriptures from their original Sanskrit and Arabic were translated into English by 
the Company officials, and were used while adjudicating over matters of personal 
laws of the native communities. Charles Hamilton’s translation of the Arabic text, 
al-Hidaya (the Guide), which was translated in the eighteenth century, and Neil 
Baillie’s ‘Digest of Mohammedan Law’ based on Fatwa Alamgiri served as the  
guidelines of the courts for well over two centuries. After the Mutiny of 1857, the 
administration of India shifted from the Company to the British Crown, and the 
British felt   an urgent need to introduce its own legal system. This led the 
enactment of various Acts in a codified form from 1858-1910.  For instance, the 
Government of India Act 1858 brought in major changes in the legal structures. The 
Supreme Courts were replaced by integrated High Courts with the Privy Council as 
the final Court of Appeal.(Mahmood 1995). By the end of the 19th century, almost 
every aspect of the personal laws of all Indian communities had become part of ‘case 
law’. However, the British were very cautious about introducing any law closely 
connected to religion, especially ones whose enactment could put the British rulers’ 
political interests in jeopardy.  Hence, the Indians were left to be governed by their 
religion-based laws, or personal laws (ibid.12).  
During British rule in India, the conduct of Muslim law had been mediated 
through the appointment of a Kazi. However, in 1864 the British government 
abolished this post. Although, the Shariat was not fully in force during the British 
rule, the official Kazis, who were paid by the government, did dispense legal 
absolution in cases of marriage, divorce, dower, and so on. But once official the post 
of kazi was abolished, the community was left to those Kazis who had no official 
authority and were perhaps less well-trained, and, therefore, had far less influence 
on the community when it came to enforcing compliance with some of the 
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injunctions. In this situation women became more vulnerable with regard to the 
customs and usages which deprived them of their Islamic rights (Lateef 1990:62). 
As the legal system developed during British rule in India, the prevailing 
Islamic law was superseded to a great extent by customary laws, whereby a number 
of customs, practices and usages relating to family life, which were alien to Islam, 
became part of the law. In due course of time these customs and usages were 
embedded in Muslim homes and social structures. Apart from the fact that 
Customary Laws were being applied during British rule in India, the courts took 
decisions on Muslim Law where applicable. These decisions interpreting Muslim 
law resulted in the body of laws, which, as stated earlier, were known as the Anglo-
Muhammedan Law. Many of these so-called interpretations of Muslim Law were 
contrary to the spirit and content of Islamic Law, and adversely affected the legal 
status of Muslim women in India. In fact, as pointed out by Patel (1979):  ‘the law 
that was applied by the British Indian courts was not Muslim Law in strict sense 
but was what may be called as, a cross-breed, a hybrid, resulting from the 
interaction of the Principles of Muslim Law with the rules of Muslim Law as these 
were adopted and applied by the British Indian courts pursuant to the powers 
conferred on them by several legislative enactments defining their powers and 
jurisdiction to apply Muslim law in the determination of controversies before them’ 
(p.8). 
 
Women’s movement and the Question of Women’s Rights 
 
The link between the women’s movement, the proximity of several of its leaders to 
the Indian political leadership and the recognition of the importance of women’s 
issues by the national leadership, all contributed towards strengthening the 
women’s movement as a whole. The women’s movement in India emerged during 
the 1920s. The political and economic changes that had taken place in the 19th 
century forced the reformers to reassess the status of women and bring about some 
changes by advocating women’s education and rising the age of marriage. The 
Indian women’s movement sought to develop a broad political, social and economic 
agenda in which legislative changes have been the cutting edge of induced social 
change. The linkage between social reform, the status of women and the national 
movement was a major source of numerical strength for the national movement, 
and political support for the women’s movement. This linkage further strengthened 
the struggle against colonialism. The Women’s Indian Association Report of 1933 
reveals that the Simon Commission viewed the Indian women’s movement as the 
possible ‘key of progress’ for an India free of communalism (Lateef, 1990:87).  
 
 4 
The movement’s success in bringing about social and legal reform facilitated the 
struggle for the enfranchisement of Indian women. By 1921, women had won the 
right to be elected to central and state legislatures, although women’s status as 
voters depended upon their husband’s property. From the early 19th century, the 
status of women became an issue of concern for male upper-caste and upper-class 
Hindu reformers. Their early efforts were directed against certain customs such as 
sati and the sanctions against widow re-marriage which were detrimental to the 
status of women. Later, they tried to educate women and bring them into public life. 
In south India the campaign was on to suppress the devdasi (temple prostitution) 
system. However, Indian men who encouraged female education and the formation 
of social organization did not relish hearing women speak about the evils of 
patriarchy. Franchise and civil rights were ideal issues for women to pursue since 
these discussions amongst them could take place without reference to sensitive 
social or cultural matters (Forbes 1998:93). 
 By the second decade of the 20th century, reform efforts were not exclusively 
confined to men, several all-India level women’s organisations run by women also 
emerged to champion women’s rights. The rreformers stepped up the pressure on 
the Government to introduce a legislation that would strengthen the forces of social 
change. The basic arguments revolved around the need to get rid of age-old 
traditions, customary practices and social taboos, which were sapping the vitality of 
women’s role in national life. 
The kind of reforms they advocated was female education, the franchise, and 
changes in the Hindu Personal Law affecting marriage, family and property rights. 
Following 1930 and 32, when women made a tremendous impression through their 
involvement in national politics, all petitions requesting legislative changes or other 
moves design to improve the status of women were prefaced with reference to what 
women had done in the nationalist movement (Everett 1978). Thus, improving the 
status of women in India was a major social issue during the 19th century. The 
issues that women specified for consideration were inheritance, marriage and 
guardianship of children. The ultimate goal was to have a new law (Renuka Ray, 
AIWC Files no. 84). Renuka Ray argued in favour of new laws for all women, 
irrespective of caste or religion. She wrote that ‘the legal position of Indian women 
was ‘one of the most inequitable in the world today. Legal change would both 
remove the suffering of individual women, and allow India to join the modern and 
progressive states of the world’ (Forbes1998:113). She advocated for a new personal 
and family law that would make women independent and fully equipped to 
participate in public life. 
The two organisations namely Women’s Indian Organization formed in 1917 
and the All India Women’s Conference (led by the Indian National Congress), 
formed in 1927, and mainly formed to discuss issues specific to women and their 
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social and legal disabilities. The main concern of Indian women’s organisations was 
to make reforms in the legal status of women. The child marriage controversy 
caused them to view women’s legal status as an especially serious problem, and 
from it grew demands for improvements in women’s rights to divorce inherit, and 
control property. All through the 1930s, in order to press their demands, women’s 
organisations formed committees on legal status, undertook studies of the laws, 
talked to lawyers, published pamphlets on women’s position and encouraged 
various pieces of legislation to enhance women’s status. However, they saw all 
Assembly bills that were introduced in the 1930s, like the Hindu Woman’s Right to 
Property Bill, an amendment to the Child Marriage Restraint Act, a bill to allow 
inter-caste marriage, the Hindu Woman’s Right to Divorce Act, the Muslim 
Personal Law Bill, the Prevention of Polygamy Bill, and the Muslim women’s Right 
to Divorce Bill, as a piecemeal approach to improving women’s status. Women like 
Muthulakshmi, Renuka, Mrs. Damle and Hamid Ali were not satisfied with these 
piecemeal acts but wanted comprehensive legislation accompanied by social and 
economic change instead (Forbes1998).  
 However, when these bills were discussed it became apparent that male 
reformers and women’s organisations had differing concepts of women’s legal needs.  
 ‘For Muslim reformers, as for their Hindu counterparts, women were 
symbolic not only of all that was wrong with their culture and religious life, but also 
of all that was worth preserving. If women personified the plight of their 
community: its backwardness, its ignorance of the faith, its perilous cultural and 
historical viability, they were also at the core of family life, the potential purveyors 
of ethical values and religious ideals. For Muslim reformers, considerations of 
women’s position in the family and plans for women’s education included 
discussions of household customs and rituals, of purdah, and of Islamic law as it 
pertained to women’ (Minault,1998:6).  
 The women’s organisations though were more in favour of setting a women’s 
agenda which dealt only with the rights and protection of women without being 
affected by other considerations. Women levied pressure on both the British 
government and the Congress party to incorporate their demands as policy matter. 
However, there had been a struggle amongst reformers, conservatives, 
community leaders, the government and women leaders as to who would set the 
agenda for women. The Indian National Congress proved a difficult ally. Only a few 
members agreed that women’s legal rights deserved the highest priority. The 
members of the Muslim League, on a resolution moved by Jinarja Hedge to set up a 
committee on the legal disabilities of women, openly said that they had no objection 
to setting up a committee as long as the committee confined its enquiry to Hindu 
law. Jinna, however, firmly supported Bhupendranath Basu’s Special Marriage 
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Amendment Bill (1912), which provided legal cover for marriages falling outside the 
Hindu and Muslim laws, although it caused dismay among Muslims. 
Despite all these emerging political differences between the male members of 
the Congress Party and the Muslim League, the Indian women’s movement, 
specifically the Congress led AIWC, remained united on the issues relating to 
women. Begum Shahnawaz appealed to Hindu and Muslim women to work together 
for the benefit of all Indian women. The All India Women’s Conference, the Indian 
Women’s Association and the National Council for Women opposed the idea of 
separate electorates, which divided women along communal lines. These three 
organisations subsequently dispatched a telegram to the British Prime Minister 
condemning separate electorates. In 1931, Begum Shahnawaz reiterated the need 
for women’s unity. 
Begum Jehan Ara Shahnawaz, (who later became a member of the Anjuman 
Himayat-i-Islam), devoted all her efforts towards the cause of women. She passed a 
resolution against polygamy in the session held at Lahore in 1918. She pointed out 
that Indian unity was only possible through its women, and in a message to south 
Indian women, she made an appeal that all women work together for the upliftment 
of Indian women. In words of Kamaldevi Chttopadhaya ‘…the women’s movement is 
essentially a social movement and part of the process of enabling a constituent part 
of society to adjust itself to the constantly changing social and economic conditions 
and trying to influence these changes and conditions with a view to (merely) 
minimizing irritations and conflicts…. Women power is basic and the woman must 
be recognized as a social and economic factor on her own and not as assistant to 
man…’ (Roshini, February 1946 No1 p4).  
 
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur wrote  
‘…the proper status of women in modern society should, therefore, be settled 
not in the light of history but of ethics. It must accord not with the past, but 
with the general moral ideal which is current at the present time. The 
treatment of women must be on a level with the general conception of 
conduct and behaviour which each society seeks to realize… therefore, when 
we women of India today desire a change in outlook as far as our status in 
concerned, we can not be criticized, because in every age we have to make the 
appropriate social venture….’ (Meherally1947: 90-92) 
 
The passing of the Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929) was an outcome of the 
struggle of the women’s movement.  Bringing a legislation to raise the age of 
consent of marriage of a girl and a boy was another effort these organizations made 
with the support of both the Congress Party and the Muslim League despite their 
differences when it came to political power sharing in India. The Begum of Bhopal, 
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in her second annual meeting of the All-India Women’s Conference in Delhi in 1928, 
called on all the women present to avoid the religious divisions and bickering which 
had affected Indian political life. She asked the women to work in solidarity to 
improve the quality of women’s education, and gain greater rights for women. She 
particularly supported the Sarda bill, then in the legislature. Despite Muslim 
leaders opposing the amendment of this Act (to exclude Muslims from this Act), the 
women’s organisations tried to remained unite on this issue. Muslim women 
members of the AIWC presented a memorial in support of the Sarda Act and told 
the Viceroy: 
‘We, speaking also on behalf of the Muslim women of India, assert that it is 
only a small section of Mussalman men who have been approaching your Excellency 
and demanding exemption from the Act. This Act affects girls and women far more 
than it affects men, and we deny their right to speak on our behalf’ (Forbes 
1998:89). 
In 1929 Abru Begam urged women to support the campaign to raise the age 
of consent for marriage. The Women’s Indian Association emphasised the need for 
women to secure their civil rights through legislation. Mrs. Hamid Ali, in her 
presidential address to the AIWC held in Lucknow in 1932 demanded a solution for 
the disabilities of Hindu women, and urged the removal of customary law of the 
Muslims, particularly in the North -West province, which had denied Muslim 
women of their Islamic rights. She urged for the implementation of the Shariat law, 
since the Shariat gave certain rights of inheritance to Muslim women, which the 
customary laws did not. Commenting on a debate in the Central Legislative 
Assembly on women’s legal disabilities in 1940, she asked,  
 
‘When will men of India realize that it is of no use asking a third party to play fair 
when they themselves are willing to close their eyes to all the wrongs the women 
suffer and have mental reservations when freedom is proposed for woman-hood?. 
... Indians would not gain Swaraj until they had set their own house in order and 
granted women legal equality’. (Geraldine 1981p: 63).  
In 1934, the AIWC asked the government to appoint an all-India commission 
to consider the legal disabilities of women. Renuka Ray, legal secretary of AIWC, 
argued in favour of new laws for all women, regardless of which community they 
belonged to.  She opined that legal change would both alleviate the suffering of 
individual women and allow India to join the modern and progressive states of the 
world.  
Thus the women’s movement was concerned more about the legal disabilities 
of women irrespective of religious boundaries and worked together to remove these 




The Begum and a number of other Muslim women were becoming aware of an all 
India sisterhood in which Muslim women could support Hindu women in their 
campaign to raise the age of marriage, while calling upon Hindu women to support 
their efforts to lessen the restriction of Purdah. However, the desire for the 
recognition of the Sharait as Muslim persona law was an issue which separated 
Muslim women from their Hindu sisters. If the Shariat were in force instead of 
customary law, Muslim women felt, then their rights to property, inheritance, and 
choice in marriage would be affirmed. Hence, in the matter of legal reform, Muslim 
women’s sense of separate community identity was articulated and recognition of 
the shariat as the operative Muslim personal law became a matter of concerned for 
both Muslim men and women’ (Minault1998:295). 
Hajra Begum, a leading member of the AIWC blamed the Muslim League for 
fomenting communalism by insisting that Muslim women leave the AIWC, a 
demand the communal electorates made almost impossible to ignore.  
 
However, assertions linking feminist and nationalist priorities were more common 
than these statements: first that women’s status could not be changed as long as 
India remained under foreign domination, and second, that the nationalist 
movement was aiding the development of the women’s movement. Nevertheless, 
while women’s organizations found it easy to take a firm and consistent stand as 
patriots, they were a bit uncomfortable when it came to accepting the priorities and 
tactics dictated by male-dominated political parties and the emerging political 
differences amongst the men of two major political parties i.e. the Indian National 
Congress and the All India Muslim League. 
At the beginning of the emancipation struggle among Muslim women of the 
Indian subcontinent access to education and the campaign against purdah were the 
main points. The late 19th and first half of the 20th century were characterized by 
considerable debate around these issues in the Muslim community throughout 
India. The reform efforts by men on behalf of women were sparked by the notable 
progress made by other communities in India, and inspired by the changes taking 
place in Muslim countries of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the emergence of 
national sentiments among Muslim women was hampered by religious restrictions, 
social restraints, educational backwardness and economic limitations. The period 
between 1911 and1924 was a momentous time in Indian Muslim politics 
encompassing as it did the Balkan wars, the revocation of the partition of Bengal- a 
blow to those who had seen eastern Bengal as a source of Muslim administrative 
jobs and political influence, the refusal of the government to approve the plan of 
some Muslim leaders for a university in Aligarh, the Khilafat movement, the non-
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cooperation and Swadeshi movements and so on. In all these political efforts women 
had a role to play. 
In the post-World War I era, changes were occurring throughout the Muslim 
Middle East. The pressure of many forces, such as the rapidly extending network of 
communication, expansion of world knowledge through the press, Western material 
goods, new forms of amusement, Western impact on secularism and nationalism, 
etc. loosened the control of Islam as an iron-clad system of rules and traditions gave 
way to a more individual interpretation of Islam. The most debated point 
throughout the Muslim Middle eastern countries was the orthodox Islam its social 
system which was based on the seventh century Islamic set up. Since the central 
fact of this social system was the position assigned to women, the re-interpretation 
of religion sought to harmonize the emancipation of women with the spirit of Islam. 
Education, veiling, polygamy, divorce, age of marriage, etc, were topics of intense 
debate. The problem resolved itself along two lines, one exemplified by the case of 
Turkey, which chose to repudiate the inviolable authority of religion over the state 
and society and engaged in the pursuit of progress as a single goal. The rest of the 
Muslim world followed the second course set by Egypt, which attempted to keep all 
social reforms within the spirit of the law. This new spirit of liberalism deeply 
affected the lives of women, and a small minority began to question the relationship 
between the accepted teachings of Islam and the demands of the modern world 
(Woodsmall 1986).  
The dismemberment of the Ottoman (Turkish) empire during World War I 
opened the floodgates of Muslim agitation. The Muslims of India regarded the 
Turkish Sultan as their Caliph and reacted passionately to the demand for the 
territorial integrity of Turkey. The agitation aroused religious sentiments, which 
created a deep hatred against the British government among the Muslim masses. 
The support of the Congress party further intensified the agitation.  
Although the Muslim orthodox influence was dominant in India, two 
movements in the north represented a liberalizing influence through a re-
interpretation of the Koran - the Aligarh and the Ahmadiyah movements. The 
educational influence of the Aligarh movement radically changed the Muslim 
outlook. The Ahmadiyah movement, on the other hand, was concerned primarily 
with the social teachings of Islam with regard to modern progress. Both had an 
effect on the gradual emancipation of Muslim women (Ghadially1996).  
A more spirited advocate of women’s rights in Islam was Sayyid Mumtaz Ali. 
In 1898 he published his book Huquq al Niswan (women’s rights). Women also 
organized various Anjuma-e-Khawateen-e-islam (Muslim Women’s Organisation) in 
different parts of the country. Attiya Begum established a Muslim women’s 
conference at Aligarh in 1905. The All India Muslim Ladies Conference, claiming to 
represent the interests of all Muslim women, was established in Lahore in 1907. 
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The latter’s session in Lahore in 1917 attracted 400 Muslim women participants 
from across the country. The Anjuman-e-Khwateen-Deccan was formed in 1919. At 
the meetings of these organisations, resolutions were regularly passed in favour of 
women’s education, and against polygamy and the veil. 
The All India Muslim Ladies Association, an off-Shoot of the Mohammadan 
Educational Conference was founded in 1914 and controlled primarily by north 
Indian Sunni Muslims. In its meetings between 1914 and 1920 it passed resolutions 
centered around the promotion of women’s education, relaxing purdah rules and 
abolishing polygamy. The emergence of the women’s movement in the 1920s was 
also viewed as a movement against purdah and prepared society and women for 
greater participation in social activities. However, in 1930 the Educational 
Conference noted that economic pressures were working against the system of 
purdah (Caton, 1930). The All India Women’s Conference session of 1932 which was 
held in Lucknow, passed a resolution favouring girls’ (particularly Muslim girls) 
education. Resolutions were also passed against communal electorates for women, 
untouchability, the prevalence of unilateral (i.e., Muslim men’s) right to divorce, 
and on communal unity.   
Certainly, since the turn of the century, women have found themselves 
confronting the conservative religious sections in their struggle for their rights. 
However, at the same time, women also used the Sharia in the first half of the 19th 
century to press their claim to property that was being denied to them under 
customary law, their quarrel with Islam, or rather, the official and ultra-right use of 
Islam-- came later.  
This struggle on the part of the Muslim women was joined by women from 
other communities as well, and this joint struggle made a strong impact in the fight 
for rights. It was in 1903 that a Muslim woman, Bi Amaa, was heard speaking in 
public for the first time on the conditions of Muslim women, their lack of education 
and general backwardness. Anjuman Khwateen-e-Islam, Haqooq-e-Niswan 
(Women’s Rights), Rahbar-e-Niswaan (Women’s Guardian) and the Khilafat 
movement were some of the movements women participated actively in even if they 
were not initiated by women themselves (Quyum 2003).  
Other organisations were the Tahzeeb-e-Niswan, Lahore, Anjuman Muslim 
Ladies, Amraoti, Muslim women’s Society, Lahore, Anjuman Muslim Khwateen, 
Muslim Women Rights Association Punjab, Anjuman Darul Khawateen Agra and 
Sahranpur, and Anjuman Muslim Khawateen Karachi. The Anjuman in Lahore 
was organized by the women of the family of Mian Muhammad Shafi along with 
their close friends. They met periodically in one another’s homes to discuss and 
formulate proposals for the spread of education and social reform, and to securing 
the rights given to women by Islam. Records of their proceedings were kept. A 
similar Anjuman was formed in Lucknow with some of the same purposes in mind, 
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but the active Muslim political life of Lucknow seems to have infected their 
proceedings. During the Kanpur Mosque incident in 1913, the Anjuman-e-
Khawateen called a special women’s meeting to protest the destruction of a portion 
of the mosque. The information available on these Anjumans suggests that the 
women were beginning to organize to further women’s education, secure women’s 
property and inheritance rights, and engage in social service. The Anjumans also 
addressed themselves to political questions related to their reverence for Islam, and 
in response to the perceived threats to Muslim shrines and other Muslim land in 
the years 1911 and 1913 (Minault1981: 87-88). 
Within a short time, Muslim women established their political importance 
and contributed significantly to the freedom movement. While the educated Muslim 
men remained occupied with their professional engagements, the women utilized 
the time to propagate the national objectives. Muslim women leaders were more 
concerned with the issues like education, polygamy, and even the economic 
independence of women. They were trying to convince women to exercise control 
over their own condition. In this regard the Princess Durresgagvar of Hydrabad 
suggested that women should ‘…Let your ambitions strive to remove the legal and 
social disabilities that stand in your way. Let your ability prove the supreme 
justification of that removal’ (Lateef 1990:83). 
A comparative study of Muslim women with the women of other communities 
in India indicates that while the Indian National Congress patronized the political 
participation of women, Muslim leaders like Sir Syed Ahamd Khan and Allama 
Muhammad Iqbal, who advocated the modernization of Muslim life and thought, 
were hesitant to support the women’s freedom as practised and projected in the 
Western world. They propagated the idea that Muslim society needs to develop and 
nourish on the Islamic traditions by the educated Muslim women. However, the 
political awakening brought about by the Indian National Congress among non-
Muslim educated Indians interacted with Muslim thought and led to revision of 
their orthodox behaviour regarding the role of Muslim women in the modern age.  
The 1930s witnessed a change in the political situation.  The struggle 
movement for the freedom was accelerated.  On 4 March, 1934, at a combined 
meeting, various factions of the Muslim League, Delhi, decided to unite to one 
Muslim League, of which Jinnah was elected the president. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 
a prominent leader of the Congress, did not join the Muslim League till 1913, 
although he supported the League movement for separate electorate for Muslims. 
He even contested successfully against the League candidate for the election of the 
Viceroy's Legislative Council. Within the Congress, he however, always tried to 
bargain for one-third reservation for his community. The formation of the All India 
Muslim League (AIML) was a major landmark in the history of modern India, and 
was the first formal entry of a centrally organized political party meant exclusively 
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for Muslims. This was the start of a new era in India's struggle for independence, 
and stemmed from the Muslims perception that there is a poor participation of 
Muslims in Congress -- Of the seventy-two delegates attending the first session of 
the Congress only two were Muslims.  Further, the Muslims felt that the All India 
Congress was unwilling to acknowledge the Muslim cause, and insisted on 
portraying only two parties in this regard, namely the Congress and the British. 
However, Jinnah emphasized the fact that the Congress could not win the battle for 
freedom until it gained the support of all communities, and assurance was given to 
the minorities about their rights and protection of interest in an independent India.  
 
On 5 February, 1935, at a meeting of the Muslim Union at Aligarh, Jinnah said,  
"I am convinced and you will agree with me that the Congress policy is to 
divide the Muslims among themselves. It is the same old tactics of the 
British Government. They follow the policy of their masters. Don't fall into 
the trap. …the Muslim League is determined to win freedom, but it should be 
a freedom not only for the strong and the dominant but equally for the weak 
and the suppressed." 
(Indian History: Modern India: Formation of Muslim League, 
http://www.indhistory.com/muslim-league.html) 
 
In 1935, the British introduced the Government of India Act. With the introduction 
of this Act, the political process for community identity of the respective religious 
groups in India accelerated.  Indians, both Muslims and Hindus, without realizing 
the latent impact the Act had on the overall situation of the country, used the 
opportunity it provided to modify some aspects of their religious personal law, a 
modification that would apparently give some relief to the community in general 
and women, who were the victims of various customary laws in particular. As far as 
Muslims were concerned, during this period the Ulemas and the Muslim League 
were the two most prominent groups articulating the interests of the Muslim 
community. These Ulemas, being conservatives, claimed themselves, the custodian 
of the Shariat by providing the Muslim community with religious and political 
guidance according to Islamic principles and commandments (Farooqi 1963). The 
communalization of female political identity began after the act of 1935, and the 
growing rift between two communities the - the Hindus and the Muslims- created 
an entirely different environment. In words of Shaista Ikramulla, 
‘I faced this tension directly, as I was dropped by my Hindu friends with 
whom I worked for the cause of women. In this situation Muslim women 
thought to go with Muslim League for the consolidation and interest of the 
community’ (Begum Shaista Ikramulla, 1963: 87).  
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On the one hand, when the Federal Legislature started functioning after the 
elections under the Act of 1935, the Ulema of the Jamiat introduced the Shariat 
Application bill into the Federal Assembly to change Muslim personal law. On the 
other hand the Muslim League was concerned with the political and economic 
demands of the Muslim bourgeoisie vis-à-vis its Hindu counterpart (Prashar 1992). 
The middle class and rich landlords were the main supporters of the Muslim 
League. However, the AI M L, which claimed to represent Indian Muslims, took a 
long time to induce and impress upon Muslim women to come forward and assist 
the male members in the realization of national aspirations. Thus, the 
emancipation of Muslim women came only in the mid-1930s when Jinnah began to 
reorganize and revitalize the moribund AIML, the most authoritative Muslim 
political organization since its inception in 1906. After 1935, the Muslim League 
took up the task of mobilizing Muslim women. Begum Mohammad Ali was 
nominated to the Working Committee of the AIML by Jinnah, and represented the 
Muslim women in the Working Committee. While sitting on a chair of the Working 
Committee of All India Muslim League, she addressed the gathering of the party 
members and appealed to the Muslims to have patience and maintain unity with 
their ranks. She appreciated that Muslim women had been given an opportunity in 
the political field. 
Realizing the women participation in the freedom movement, the League 
adopted the following resolution regarding the formation of a Women Sub-
Committee at the Annual Session held at Patna from 26-29th March 1938. 
Whereas it is necessary to afford adequate opportunities to women for their 
development and growth in order to participate in the struggle for social, economic 
and political emancipation of the Muslim nation in India, this Session of the All 
India Muslim League resolves that an All India Muslim Women's Sub-Committee 
be formed. (Azra 2000:198-99). 
With this objective in view, the Sub-Committee was given the power to 
organize provincial and district women's Sub-Committees under the Provincial and 
District Muslim Leagues,  enlist larger numbers of women to the membership of the 
Muslim League,  carry on an intensive propaganda amongst Muslim women 
throughout India in order to instill in them a sense of greater political consciousness 
and finally, to advise and guide them in all such matters that rested on them for the 
upliftment of the Muslim society.  
The prominent members of this Sub-Committee, some of whom served with 
the National Congress, were: Lady Abdullah Haroon, Begum Shah Nawaz, Mrs. 
Rashida Latif, Begum Shahabuddin, Mrs. M.M. Ispahani, Miss. F. Jinnah, Mrs. 
Faiz Tyabji, Begum Habib-ul-lah, Begum Aizaz Rasul, Begum Nawab Siddique Ali 
Khan, Lady Imam, Mrs. Hussain Malik, and Mrs. Ayisha Kulhamoro Haji 
(proceedings of the All India Muslim League vol.11: 318). 
 14 
   
Lady Abdullah entered the political arena in 1919 and worked as an ardent 
supporter of the Khilafat Movement in her province. She took a keen interest in 
women’s education and started a school at her home. She also founded a women’s 
organization known as Anjuman-i-Khawateen to improve the social and economic 
condition of the women of Sindh. In 1938 she was nominated to the Women's 
Central Sub-Committee of the AIML, and was also elected President of the Sindh 
Provincial Women's Sub-Committee. This organization actually owes its existence 
to Lady Haroon, who through her untiring efforts was able to bring Muslim women 
under the banner of the Muslim League. She also made commendable contributions 
during the 1946 elections to the Muslim League. Lady Ghulam Hussain 
Hidayatullah began her political life in 1938 as a worker of the AIML, and was 
inducted in the Women's Central Sub-Committee. It was because of her efforts that 
various branches of the Provincial Sub-Committee were formed in different districts 
of Sindh such as Hyderabad, Nawabshah and Dadu.  With the emergence of the All 
India Muslim Women's Conference, Begum Shahnawaz devoted all her efforts 
towards its cause. She was successful in moving the organization to pass a 
resolution against polygamy in its session held at Lahore in 1918. She was also 
associated with the education and orphanage committees of the Anjuman Himayat-
i-Islam, Lahore, an active member of and remained president of the All India 
Muslim Women's Conferences of provincial branch for seven years. She was vice-
president of the Central Committee of the All India Muslim Women's Conference 
and a member of the Lahore Municipal Committee. However, as the identity 
became a key element in power politics and when the AIML realized that for the 
assertion of identity and power politics mobilizing Muslim women was necessary 
and, moreover, when she realized that the Muslim women member of AIWC were 
marginalized with regard to the wording and substance of memorials and petitions, 
she left the organization. She organized a separate political league for Muslim 
women called the Punjab Provincial Muslim Women’s League in 1936 with a goal to 
stimulate the political consciousness of Muslim women. In 1937 she was elected as a 
member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly as a unionist. In 1938 she joined the 
Women's Central Sub-Committee of the AIML. Similarly dissatisfied with the 
functioning of AIWC, Begum Aizaz Rasul, a member of the legislative council who 
demonstrated the spirit of oneness, said ‘I feel that it is in the interest of minorities 
to try to merge themselves into the majority community and advised them to give 
up separatist tendencies and throw their full weight in building up a truly secular 
state’ joined the Muslim league. 
The Council of the AIML described by the Muslim press as ‘The parliament of 
Muslim India’ was represented by elected women from various provinces. The 
women councilors strengthened the organization, performing socio-humanitarian 
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work, besides rendering the political assistance on numerous occasions. During 
1937-47, several women served on the Council of AIML, prominent among whom 
were Miss Fatima Jinnah, Mrs. Shafi Tyebji,  Begum Waseem, Begum Rehman, 
Begum abibullah, Rohila Khatoon, Begum Mian Ferozuddin, Begum Bashir Ahmed, 
Mrs. Kh. Nooruddin, Mrs. Hasina Murshed, and Mrs. K Shahabuddin.  Muslim 
women were provided the opportunity to share national responsibilities at the 
Annual Sessions, Councils and the Working Committees of the Provincial Leagues. 
Stressing the importance of the Women Sub-Committee, Jinnah in his 
presidential speech at Lahore Session stated: 
 ‘You may remember that we appointed a committee of ladies at the 
Patna Session. It is of very great importance to us, because I believe 
that it is absolutely essential for us to give every opportunity to our 
women to participate in our struggle of life and death. Women can do a 
great deal within their homes even under PURDAH. We appointed this 
committee with a view to enable them to participate in the work of the 
League’. (Azra 2000:33)  
 
Despite Jinah being a supporter of women’s cause, he was not in favour of setting 
up of the Punjab Muslim Women’s League. This is evident from the fact that when 
Begum Shah Nawaz told the AIML Council at Lucknow in October 1937 that she 
had set up a Punjab Muslim Women’s League, Jinnah stood up and said that he did 
not believe in separate organizations for men and women. 
 The Women’s Sub-Committee was a preliminary plan to encourage women to 
associate with the national movement. The task before the League was tremendous 
and necessitated establishing a broad-based organization to groom and guide 
Muslim women to compete for the advancement of political and public life. At an All 
India Muslim Women’s Conference presided over by Lady Fazli Hussain in Lahore, 
there was a demand from 500 women to abolish the customary law and accord 
women their rights according to Muslim Personal Law.  
(http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/spedtion/23%20march%202005). 
 
Women and the debate on legislation 
 
The reform in Muslim law, particularly related to women, has been the subject of 
debate both within and outside the community. It is to be noted that despite the 
many centuries of Muslim rule, the community did not adopt the Shariat as a basis 
of law, and women’s rights in the Shariat were almost never compiled or enforced. 
Even their right to divorce and remarriage suffered (Andrews 1939). As stated 
earlier, the conduct of Muslim law during Muslim rule in India had been mediated 
through the appointment of a kazi. However, after the abolition of the post by the 
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British government in 1864, the organization of Muslim law and the restrictions 
within it was left to individuals. This had an adverse impact on women. On the one 
hand it made women vulnerable to the whims of men in the family, and on the 
other, hand, it encouraged an increased dependency on the kazis, who had no 
official authority and were perhaps less well trained, and therefore carried less 
clout with the community to enforce compliance with some of the injunctions.  
Urdu writings of the late nineteenth century show that Muslim reformers 
like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of Aligrah, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband, and 
Syed Mumtaz Ali of Lahore evolved a critique of contemporary Muslim life and 
culture in response to the pressures of colonial rule. The theme of this critique 
revolves around three main issues: a consciousness about the loss of political power 
to foreign rule, the analysis of the causes of that decline and the loss of religious and 
cultural vitality; and, finally, the evolution of a programme of reform that would 
remedy that decline. However, there was one common point on which all reformers 
agreed- the fact that the status of Muslim women required amelioration. Mumtaz 
Ali pointed out that the position of women in Islamic law was theoretically higher 
than the actual status accorded to them. The cause of this discrepancy in his 
opinion was adherence to false customs, and hence, he felt that changing Muslim 
practice had to be the highest priority and women’s adherence to false custom had 
to be combated. He also felt that there was a need to change the views of those men 
who felt that keeping women in ignorance and isolation was part of their religion. 
However, at the turn of the century with a growing strong urge for 
maintaining the ethnic/ group differentiation and identities by the political parties 
for vested political interest and power politics, the question of the enactment of 
Shariat law evolved. Besides, the discourse of Muslim reformers deprecated useless 
custom- particularly as observed by women, and placed high priority on the need to 
observe the Shariat in everyday life. In some cases reformers advocated legislative 
enactments in order to bring the Muslim Personal Law closer to the spirit of the 
scriptures, as well as to improve women’s rights in the context of family relations. 
Reformers were also concerned about British legal actions invalidating certain types 
of Waqf (pious endowments), which had been used in the past to support the donor’s 
surviving family members-who were frequently women. Hence, the demand for 
Shariat law was seen both as a tool to maintain the ethnic/group identity as well as 
a resentment for the British rule. 
Women’s groups felt that Muslim women did have rights under the Shariat 
and hence strongly urged the community to support the application of these laws to 
improve the status of women. The Shariat bill, which was debated during the 
heyday of the Indian women’s movement, aroused considerable public interest. The 
Muslim community thought that it would serve two purposes by supporting the bill, 
that is, further their interests in women’s rights, and unify the community.  
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The Ulemas also showed a deep concern about the fact that various Islamic legal 
principles were adhered to by several communities amongst the Muslims, as a 
result of which women were not being given any share in inheritance. The 
reformers and community leaders came to a consensus: that Muslim women’s 
interests would be best served with the restoration of rights under the Shariat or 
Muslim Personal Law, which over the period of time, had been superseded by 
custom and tradition.  
This realization which took place gradually at the various levels of the 
leadership hierarchy, eventually led to the launching of an organized movement for 
a mandatory application of Muslim law to Muslims in the state courts, called 
Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat. The Movement was first launched locally in different 
parts of the country. Various local and central enactments abrogating non-Islamic 
customs followed by many Muslims in India were brought in the Indian statute 
book, example being the Mapilla Succession Act of 1918 and the Cutch Memon Act 
1920. 
Thus, by and large there was general acceptance from all concerned about the 
need for change and for removing the legal disabilities of women. However, due to 
the politicization of group solidarity and the need to maintain identity, the debate 
on reform was divided into two groups of people: one the one hand were those people 
who opted for covert change without any open rejection of past customs and 
practices, which would make community solidarity more difficult in political and 
economic terms. On the other were those who felt social change was a necessary 
prerequisite for the desired political and economic changes in the community 
(Lateef,1990:17). However, one can not help feeling that this division overlooks the 
basic question of improving the status of women, something earlier reformers and 
the women’s movement had advocated. Thus, there was in general a difference of 
opinion (community-wise) regarding the process through which social change should 
be implemented in India rather than an emphasis on the question of women’s 
rights. As Robinson observed that Muslim communities had to dealt with the reality 
of a new and powerful adversary who not only introduced changes that 
fundamentally affected their economic position (in case of Bengali Muslims) 
constantly and successively, but also eroded the inscriptive rules by which success 
and status were determined (Robinson, 1974).  
Nonetheless, Muslims felt a need to evolve a common political and economic 
strategy to minimize differences between these two groups of reformers, and this 
process had some positive impact on women. At the same time however, a strong 
need to protect community interest and the importance of group cohesion proved 
detrimental to the interests of Muslim women, which were consciously subjugated 
to the perceived interests of the community. Therefore, on the one hand one group 
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was in favour of changes, but within individual communities, making community 
interest and group cohesion a priority, while on the other the social reformers 
fought for legislatively enforced secular changes. For instance, the enforcement of 
Muslim Personal Law and the realization of women’s right to divorce may be cited 
as examples of the process of reconstruction of community identity (Azra Asghar Ali 
2000). The basis for these enactments was derived from the eclectic approach 
adopted in Turkey and later in Egypt, which compounded the different schools of 
jurisprudence to favour women (Anderson 1959).  
It is important to note that there was an argument amongst the reformers as 
to how the interests and rights given to women in Islam which were being 
superseded by the customs and traditions would be restored. Muslim felt, especially 
after the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, that they were in a position to do 
so because of the non-interfering stance the government took in socio-religious 
matters. It is also to be noted that in that period the subsequent constitutional 
discourse also became a means to express the numerical strength of the Muslim 
community along with the issues of Muslim women’s rights. ‘The whole agenda of 
the restoration of women’s social rights revolved around the numerical strength of 
the community, the attitude of reformers, the governments’ approach towards the 
issue of reform and the magnitude of political support ‘ ( Azra A Ali,2000:124).   
However, communities already struggling to cope with the political and 
economic changes tended to resist social legislation. They felt they could do so 
without political or economic loss, and that the community could only profit from 
such changes through a display of numerical strength and organization, which 
required ethnic differentiation and solidarity based on traditions and customs 
antithetical to the exercise of women’s rights. While the Muslim communities 
initially supported legislations changing customs prejudicial to women, they soon 
came around to the view that Muslim women’s interests would be best served with 
the restoration of rights under the Shariat or Muslim Personal Law. Their view was 
that customs and traditions had superseded the Law.  
Women’s groups pointed out that Muslim women did have rights under the 
Shariat and urged the community to support the application of those laws to 
improve the status of women. It is to be noted that women’s realization of their 
miserable status added a new dimension to the reform process. Despite the fact that 
the number of such women was very small, they were able to shape the reformists’ 
legislation in a way that would be beneficial to their counterparts (Report of The 
Age of Consent Committee 1928-29, Government of India, Central Publication 
Branch1929:12). 
Thus, it seems that during this period Muslims were facing a peculiar 
problem as to what position to adopt vis-a-vis legislation that was apparently 
interfering with their own personal laws.   Some of the secular laws were accepted 
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but others were strongly opposed on the grounds that the Shariat had already 
prescribed rules for these matters. This is what happened with the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1876, the Indian Succession Act 1885, and the Guardian and 
the Wards Act of 1890. Most probably the Kazi Act, passed in 1880 and providing 
for the appointment of the Kazi, was meant to advise the court on matters related to 
the Shariat.  
 
Historical Background of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act 1937 
 
One of the most important aspects of the Shariat Application Act of 1937 was that it 
addressed economic conditions created by British rule, particularly in the Punjab. 
In that important agrarian province, British authority rested firmly upon the 
recognition and codification of ‘tribal’ custom, wherein women were deprived of the 
right to inherit immovable property. The Ulemas became concerned with the fact 
that Muslims in these regions were not following the rules of succession and 
inheritance enjoined by the Shariat. The prevalent customs allowed rich 
landowners to leave their entire property to male heirs, and thus avoid giving all 
the heirs their due shares as specified by Islamic law. Customary law tended to 
keep landholdings intact, or at least more intact than would be the case if daughters 
could inherit land along with sons. It is to be noted that recognition of custom, by 
tying the interests of landholders to that of the British administration, was a 
cornerstone of British policy in the Punjab. But this policy of British administration 
to save the interest of the landlords contravened the Shariat in which daughters 
have a share of half of the son in their father’s property. As a result, British rule in 
the Punjab came under increasing challenge from various sides. For instance,  the 
main challengers were urban Punjabi Muslims whose criticism was directed not just 
at the presence of the British as alien colonial rulers, but more fundamentally at 
the rural, tribal structure of authority that supported the British regime.  
Muslim reformers who were critical of the structure of tribal authority under 
the British considered nothing as more central to the definition of a collective 
Muslim identity than an increasing adherence to the Shariat, which in their opinion 
was symbolic of a primary commitment to the Muslim community. The issue of 
female inheritance was seen at two levels- ideological and political. For those 
attacking the colonial regime from an Islamic perspective, the question of female 
inheritance became an ideological issue of prime importance. As a political issue, 
the question of women’s share in inheritance was for many reformers central to the 
formation of Muslim solidarity. Thus, the question of improving the status of 
women by giving them a share in inheritance became more an issue of ideology and 




Hence support for the Shariat was symbolically important for Muslims in Punjab as 
a call for a new political order, a new foundation for the state to replace the colonial 
ideology of the British. For women, the importance of the Shariat lay less in the 
specific provisions of Muslim law than in the rejection of the normative order based 
on tribal solidarity (Gilmartin David 1981). Thus one could say that for Muslim 
women, support for the Shariat had definite, but limited, advantages.  
In such a situation, support for the Shariat denoted ties not only to the 
Islamic moral order, but also implied support for nationalist aspirations. In the 
1930s in Punjab, support for customary law was found in the Unionist Party, which 
was composed of large rural landholders of various religious communities who were 
generally in favour of the British, supporters of the Land Alienation Act, and 
inheritors of the British administrative tradition.  It was not only Hindus and Sikhs 
who were opposed to Muslim domination, but, and more important by Muslim 
supporters of the Shariat as well. These Muslims wanted to free India from British 
domination, and also transform the indigenous political system to establish a moral 
political order based on Islam. The conflict between these two groups over the 
foundations of law, the question of the legal status of women, became a significant 
symbolic issue. 
It is to be noted that by the 1920s some urban, well-educated Muslim women 
had already begun to agitate for improvements in female inheritance law. The 
Begum of Bhopal along with other women associated with the Anjuman, felt that if 
the Shariat were in force instead of customary law, Muslim women’s right to 
property, inheritance and choice of marriage would be assured. The support for the 
Shariat emerged among the Muslim League, which was urban and more 
nationalistic in their approach. Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind, the political party said to 
represent many Indian ulema, the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Islam, Madras, Anjuman-i-
Islam, Guahati, and the Anjuman-i-Islamic, Jorhat, as well as women’s 
organizations and several individuals supported legislation to validate the Shariat 
for both religious and nationalistic reasons.  These organizations spoke out strongly 
against those Muslims who chose to follow the Shariat in matters of marriage and 
divorce, but conveniently ignored it when it came to the distribution of inheritance 
and family property (Azra 2000). Such practices were widely prevalent among 
Muslims belonging to the agricultural classes, particularly in the Punjab. Under 
Punjab Law act lV of 1872, Muslim women had been deprived of their share in 
agricultural lands on account of the fact that many Indian Muslims were originally 
converts to Islam and still wanted to be governed by the laws which they had 
followed before they converted to Islam.  
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In 1925 the Ulema of the Jamiat had initially passed a resolution to disapprove the 
practice of certain Muslims adhering to customs contrary to the Shariat. Similar 
resolutions were passed in the following years. A bill was prepared with the help of 
Mufti Kifaytullah, the then president of the Jamiat. In 1927 the Jamiat-ul-Ulam-e-
Hind passed a resolution demanding the enforcement of Muslim Personal law at the 
annual meeting at Peshawar. This was followed by the introduction of the Muslim 
Shariat Bill in the council in 1934. The bill was introduced into the legislature of 
the North West Frontier Province, and later enacted as the North West Frontier 
Province Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935. Thereafter the Jamiat 
decided to have a central law enacted that would apply to the Muslim community of 
the whole of India. 
However, the bill to apply the Shariat in the Punjab, which specifically 
sought to improve women’s rights to land inheritance, was blocked by the Unionists 
in the provincial Legislative Council in the mid-1930s. In the early 1930s Malik 
Muhammad Din, a member of the Punjab Legislative Council from Lahore 
introduced a bill in the Council that called explicitly for the supercession of custom 
by Muslim personal law. Though Malik pointed to the need for improved female 
inheritance rights as a major justification for the bill, the specific circumstances of 
the bill’s introduction indicated the political conflicts underlying the issue. He 
proposed the bill largely in response to the passage in 1931 of a Unionist-backed bill 
giving legislative sanction to the local inheritance customs of the powerful, pro-
Unionist Tiwana family of Kalra, in spite of the conflict between those customs and 
the Shariat.  
However, the political nature of the conflict between custom and Shariat, and 
the central place of female inheritance within this conflict were subsequently 
analyzed in the Punjab government’s discussion of the bill. During the discussion, 
the British circulated the bill for opinions in the district, and many rural Punjabi 
Muslims felt that granting women a share in inheritance under the Shariat was a 
threat to the entire structure of rural tribal authority. The Muslim tehsildar of 
Kharian Tehsil declared that implementation of the Shariat would completely 
disintegrate the homogeneity of the agricultural tribe (Punjab Legislative Council 
Debates, Vol 19 1931, pp. 788-792: Vol. 20, pp. 61-78, 120-133, 183-205).  
Thus, the Unionist party opposed the bill on the grounds of maintaining the 
tribal system underlying their authority. The provincial government also reflected 
the same concern when it said, ‘The Governor in Council considers that the bill is 
dangerous to the general economic structure of the province as a whole, and to the 
interests of the rural Muslim community in particular’ (Gilmartin 1981:167). In 
spite of this reluctant approach and opposition from the Unionist party, educated 
women of Anjuman and other women’s groups remained active in the fight for 
inheritance rights at the all-India level, with the central issue in the fight for the 
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Shariat revolving around the challenge to the structure of political authority. 
Justice Din Muhammad of Lahore High Court observed that many rural leaders in 
Punjab were against the Shariat because they feared that in allowing daughters a 
share in inheritance, the Shariat would… ‘cut at the root of the system under which 
they were living…’ (ibid).  
Despite the opposition, the Bill was moved by Khan Habibullah Khan, a non-
official Member of the Council. Its objects and reasons were highlighted by Khuda 
Baksh, a member of the legislative Council, as follows: 
For several years past it has been the cherished desire of the Muslims of the 
N.W.F.P. that customary law should in no case take the place of the Muslim 
Personal Law. The matter has been repeatedly agitated in the press as well as on 
the platform (of the jamiat). The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind has supported the 
demand and invited the attention of all concerned to the urgent necessity of 
introducing a measure in the Council to this effect. Customary Law is a misnomer 
in as much as it has not any sound basis to stand upon and is very much liable to 
frequent changes and can not be expected to attain any time in future the certainty 
and definiteness which must be the characteristic of all laws. The status of Muslim 
women under the so-called customary law is simply disgraceful. The introduction of 
Muslim Personal Law will automatically raise them to the position to which they 
are naturally entitled.  
(The N.W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law Shariat Application bill 1934. 
Introduced in the Legislative Council of N.W.F.P., See Notification No.732 L.C. 
dated 29 March 1934, L/P&J/7/667, pp1-2, IOL). 
During the same year the bill was referred to a select Committee which 
submitted its report to the Legislative Council of the N.W.F.P. on 20 July 1935. In 
the meantime the Nawab of Hoti published a booklet referring to the status of 
Muslim women, and how the customary laws were adversely affecting their status. 
Under this customary law, after the death of a father the whole of his property went 
to his son, while the daughter would get nothing. In this particular situation the 
enforcement of Muslim Personal law was considered advantageous to Muslim 
women as it granted them inheritance rights. As a result of all these efforts, the Bill 
succeeded in securing favour in and outside the Legislative Council, and the Act 
was passed in November 1935. This effort of the N.W.F.P. Legislative Council was 
highly appreciated by Muslims in other parts of India and considered one of the 
most important efforts ever made in the best interests of Muslim women (Azra 
2000). 
The overwhelming support extended to this Act led to the introduction of a 
similar Shariat bill in the Central Legislative Assembly in the same year by M.H.M. 
Abdullah, MLA from West-Central Punjab. A motion was introduced by the 
Government of India’s Home Member, Sir Craik, to circulate the bill to elicit public 
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opinion, and was published along with the Statement of Objects and Reasons by the 
Government of India. While explaining the importance of this Bill, Craik stated, ‘It 
would secure uniformity of law among Muslims throughout British India in all their 
social and personal relations. By doing so, the claims to family inheritance rights of 
women, who, under customary law, were debarred from succeeding to the same, 
would automatically be secured’. The main provision in the bill was  
Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions 
regarding adoption, wills, women’s legacies, rights of inheritance, special property 
of females (including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift 
or any other provision of personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage including 
talaq, ila, ihar, lian, khul, mubaraa), maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, 
trusts, trusts properties and wakfs, the rule of decision in cases where the parties to 
a case are Muslims, shall be the Muslim personal law (Shariat). (Legislative 
Assembly Debates1939:2528).  
Various reasons were stated during the introduction of the bill including the 
assertion that it denounces customary law as a misnomer ‘in as much as it has not 
any sound basis to stand upon and is very much liable to frequent changes and 
cannot be expected to attain at any time in future the certainty and definiteness 
which must be characteristics of all laws’. The other major reason for introducing 
the bill was said to be the improvement of the status of women. Customary law gave 
women lesser rights than the Shariat, and so the introduction of Muslim Personal 
law would raise their status to the level to which they were entitled. In the Federal 
Assembly of Punjab it was also stated that the Muslim women of Punjab condemned 
customary law as it adversely  affected their rights, and demanded instead the 
application of Muslim Shariat law (Legislative Assembly Debates, III:p2530-2532). 
   During the legislative debates, it was repeatedly stressed that this Bill, 
representing a consensus of Muslims throughout India stating that they wished to 
have their personal lives guided by the Shariat, would grant women greater rights. 
Speakers as diverse as Sir Mohammad Yaqub from Moradabad, Dr. Ziauddin 
Ahmad from Aligrah, the poet and journalist Zafar Ali Khan from Lahore, the 
former Khilafat leader Maulana Shaukat Ali, the urbane Congress lawyer Asaf Ali 
from Delhi, the even more urbane M.A Jinnah from Bombay and regional leaders 
such as Maulvi Syed Murtaza of Madras, Maulvi Mohammad Abdul Ghani from 
East Bengal and Abdul Qayyum form the North-West Frontier province all voiced 
their sympathy for downtrodden Muslim women and their desire to see their lot 
bettered.  
However, H.M. Abdullah Khan Bahadur Sheikh Fazl-i-Haq Piracha pointed 
out that the opinions sent by the local governments to the federal legislature did not 
contain any opinions from women’s organizations. When the Federal Assembly 
considered the report of the Select Committee, supporters of the bill repeatedly 
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asserted that it was designed to bring justice to women. It was also made clear that 
Muslim women had expressed their strong support for the measure. While debating 
the Bill, Mr Abdul Qaiyum (North –West Frontier Province: General) added, 
There is a great awakening among the Muslim masses and they are terribly 
conscious of the wretched condition socially, politically and economically.  
This feeling is not merely confined to males but it has spread to the females 
also, and for the first time the Muslim women in India have given expression to 
their strong feeling against the dead hand of customary law which has reduced 
them into the position of chattels. People have no idea of what terrible conditions 
the Muslim women have had to endure in my own province: I can say that whenever 
a Muslim died, at least before the Frontier Shariat Law was enacted in the North-
West Frontier Province, his daughter, his sister and his wife all used to be thrown 
into the street, and the reversioner in the tenth degree would come round and collar 
all his property. I think that the conscience of all those who believe in progress, 
social, political and economic will revolt against such practice and once people 
realise that this Bill is primarily intended to improve the status of women and to 
confer upon them benefits which are lawfully their due under the Muhammadan 
law, then will gladly support this measure. By endorsing the principles of this Bill 
we would be doing justice to millions of Indian women who profess Muslim faith. 
The day is not far off when other communities will also bring similar measures and 
when Indian women and men will be treated equally in the eyes of law in the 
matter of property, political rights, social rights and in all other respects. I have, 
therefore, great pleasure in supporting the principles of this Bill. While supporting 
the Bill, he also expressed that the bill does not go at least in one Province, namely, 
the North-West Frontier Province. (Legislative Assembly Debates 1937:1427-287) 
Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi claimed that the bill was necessary primarily 
because Muslim women were being denied their rights in matters of succession. He 
also accepted that the bill was extremely limited in its scope as it did not apply to 
agricultural land, which constituted about 99.5 per cent of all property available in 
India. He further pointed out that the idea behind seeking the sanction of the House 
was that in addition to giving a little relief to the women of the country, it would 
enable the ‘representative House for the whole of India’ to accept the principle that 
Muslim personal law should be applied to Muslims (Legislative Assembly Debates 
V:9 p1443-44). 
The bill was endorsed by the Muslim women’s groups, a fact noted by Sir 
Muhammad Yamin Khan (Agra Division) in the course of the Assembly debate 
when he said: 
– the point pressed by Muslim women of Punjab is that being Muslim why 
should they not get the benefit of Islamic law. In Islam a woman is fully entitled to 
share, she becomes the full owner of the property. I hope that this legislation will 
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come in her way simply because a particular custom prevailed which was made by 
men and not by women–no–person who wants that human society must live on the 
right principles of equity should accept those principles is so against the very root of 
the principle which gave the weaker sex a genuine and specific–. It would have been 
different if Muhammdan women did not want to have any change.’ (Legislative 
Assembly Debates1939:2530) 
 
In support of the Bill, he further said,  
– Customary law is the outcome of accustom made by men who looked to 
their own self-interest and they were not safeguarding the rights of women. 
Therefore the party really affected had no voice up till now and the women in the 
Punjab have been suffering, because the men who owned certain kind of property 
did not like that the property should pass from their family through the women to 
the other family. But that is against the Muslim idea. The Muslim idea is not that a 
woman of the family becomes a different person on her marriage because Islam does 
not recognise different families in this manner–. –Thus this Bill does not seek to 
give woman anything which is not her due; it only seeks to do away with the 
injustice done to her for along time by people who do not want to part with their 
property. And in that view I have my full support to this Bill’. (Legislative Assembly 
Debates 1937:1430) 
 
However, in response to this Bill Mr. George Joseph, a member of Legislative 
council said 
– I strongly feel that the that as far as succession at least is concerned it 
should be a matter of territorial law in which it should be possible for anybody who 
wants to know the law to look up some Code and really have the succession 
maintained in terms of that Code. I submit that the time has long gone past and I 
can only regard it as a misfortune that in the year 1937 there should be any section 
of the community which really wants to maintain a personal law on for Muslims, 
one for Hindus and another for the rest. It would have been very much better and 
more fortunate it is certainly necessary that some day or other this House should 
take up the responsibility of codifying the law of succession in India, not with 
reference to the religion of the persons concerned, but with reference to the territory 
that they inhibit: that the only basis on which we can settle this question of 
succession.  
He further said, ‘But a suggestion that has been put, especially among 
Members of my party, was that one consequence of the passing of this Bill would be 
that the position of the women members of the community would certainly be 
improved’ (Legislative Assembly Debates1939: 18219-21). 
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In support of the bill, another member of the Assembly, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, 
East Central Punjab, said that ‘the personal law refers to such questions as divorce, 
separation, succession and the like. This is a sort of domestic law for us and unless 
we come under this law there is a great danger of the Moslem losing their solidarity 
and national unity. This bill is intended to do away with those customs that are 
related to the law of succession’ (Legislative Assembly Debates1939: 1823-24). 
Members of other communities were also conscious of the significance of the 
bill. Dr G.V. Deshmukh, a non-Muhammdan member from Bombay city, took part 
in the debate and said, 
– passing of the bill is not the question of one of this political party or that 
political party for which our Maulana Zafar Ali Khan was worried rather the 
question is one which affects forty million of Indian women and therefore, all these 
outside considerations of either party or politics are absolutely irrelevant and verge 
on the vulgar– I have always maintained that when one half of the body is 
paralysed, then the body can not function, and what applies to human body equally 
applies to society. When one half of the society is paralysed by its not recognising 
the economic status of women, then, I say that that society will not and can not 
progress. And in the 20th century it is up to us who have any pretensions to call 
ourselves educated or civilized to see that the other half of the society has an equal 
status to the male half of the society–. – On account of custom, and more even than 
custom the British Courts’ customs, the customs have crystallised into law, and 
thus the chilling hand of customs has barred all progress of society of womenfolk so 
far as India is concerned. Therefore, I say that this bill which in principle gives 
economical status to one half of the society has my whole-hearted support 
(Legislative Assembly Debates 1939:1826).  
The bill was enthusiastically supported by K. Radhabai Subbaroyan, the only 
woman member of the legislature, who felt that this passage would further the 
cause of women and provide an example for other communities to follow. While 
supportive of the desire of Muslim legislators to enact laws for women, Bhai 
Parmanand and some other orthodox Hindu legislators were not in favour of an 
imposition of similar notions on Hindu women. Hence they urged Muslim legislators 
to not participate in debates on the divorce and inheritance rights of Hindu women. 
M.S. Aney (Berar, non-Mohammdan), while not supporting the bill, pointed out that 
enactment of the personal law would create a barrier between Hindus and Muslims, 
who interacted at many levels. 
On the question of introducing a uniform law versus a law for Muslims, M A 
Jinnah, a prominent Muslim legislator, put forward his argument in support of the 
bill: ‘I entirely agree that these customs which exclude female heirs are to my mind 
unjust and not only unjust but that are keeping down the economic position of 
women which is the foundation of their development and rise, and their proper and 
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equal share along with men in all walks of life’ (Legislative Assembly Debates 
1939:1832). While Mr Jinnah supported the bill, he proposed an amendment to one 
clause under which the Shariat alone would apply to men and women 
‘notwithstanding custom, usage and law’. He wanted to change the wording to 
‘custom and usage’ only, implying that prior legislation would be upheld, even when 
it clashed with the rights of women. It was an important amendment because a 
number of Muslim trading communities had already legislated the inheritance 
rights of women away. (For example, the U.P. Land Holders Act, the Cutchi Memon 
Act 1920), and without this amendment the Cutchi Memons, the Khojas, the 
Moplahs and the Baluchis would have had to divide their financial holding. 
Referring to the Cutchi Memon Act, under which the Memon community was given 
an option between Muslim law and the customary law of inheritance, he suggested 
incorporating similar provisions in the proposed bill. Since he was a moderate 
politician, his main intention was to save the future of the Muslim League by 
securing the interests of landlords and nawabs.  
However, this demand did not find favour with some of the legislators as it 
restricted women’s rights of inheritance under the Shariat. The major opposition 
came from the Jamiat, who pointed out that there was no such provision in the 
N.W.F.P. Shariat Bill, the basic starting point of this Bill. However, the bill was 
finally carried in a modified form. The final bill as enacted allowed individuals an 
option– to be governed either by the Shariat, or by their customary law only with 
regard to matters of adoption, wills and legacies (section– 3). The president of the 
Legislative Assembly, Sir Abdur Rahim, declared: 
– The object of this amendment is quite clear. In the provinces of Bihar, 
Bengal, and Orissa, there is no custom or law standing in the way of Muslims 
regarding the application of their personal law–. –if you look at the opinions 
received on the bill– sir, I fail to understand what remains after various 
amendment of my learned friend, Mr. Jinnah: the words or law? Wills, legacies, 
adoption have already been taken away from the bill to suit the purposes of a few 
people. The Select Committee exempted agricultural lands from the operations of 
this bill. In Bihar, Bengal and Orissa and also parts of other provinces, women are 
enjoying advantages of Muslim personal law and getting their full shares according 
to Shariat laws in all their ancestral property–. – I say, Sir, the mover of the bill as 
well as a few of my Muslim friends– will have the only consolation that they have 
got the Shariat bill passed by this house…I don’t like to be party to such a crippled 
measure which gives nothing but name–. – I know the amended bill restricts the 
rights of Muslims in provinces where they are already enjoying full advantages of 
Muslim Personal Law. (Legislative Assembly Debates 1939:1854) 
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However, along with these favourable responses, the Bill was strongly opposed by 
several provincial governments, Associations and certain individuals. The main 
argument presented by this opposition was that some customs and usages of law 
were so old and well-established that replacing them with the Shariat would 
seriously disrupt the whole fabric of society, since most Muslims were governed by 
local customs that deprived women of property rights. The opponents of the 
legislation demanded that the implementation of Muslim Personal law should be 
left to provincial governments to decide.  Among these opponents was Justice 
Niamatullah from Lucknow, who said that if an omnibus bill of this description 
passed into law, the result would be endless confusion for the large number of 
ancient zamindar families who had been following certain rules of succession for 
generations. The Chief Commissioner of Ajmer and Marwara was of similar opinion 
and stated that as in other areas, the people of that region would not like any 
change in their customary practices, and that female inheritance would not be 
accepted at any cost. Strengthening the argument further the DSP of Madras, Mr 
K.M.Akram, said that the situation was particularly complicated in the case of 
inter-marriage between two families following different codes and that the courts 
would perhaps find it difficult to remove a dispute under such circumstances (Azra 
2000:151).  
The Bill was eventually enacted on 16 September and was given the name of 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)–Application Act 1937. It provided a ray of hope to 
those seeking changes in the social, economic and political status of Muslim women 
in India. Thus the 19th century movement for the restoration of Muslim law to 
Muslims was, not merely a religious, but also a strong feminist movement for social 
reform (Mahmood 1995). Organizations of Muslim women in the country supported 
the movement whole-heartedly. Since Muslim law gave them, at least in theory, a 
better legal status and property rights than that found in the usage of the country. 
While this Act undoubtedly provided  more relief to the women as far as the right to 
inheritance was concerned, it is important to note that the advantages gained by 
women after the enactment of this law tilted more towards their symbolic value 
than towards making Islamic law uniform for the Muslim community of the country 
as a whole. However, it was realized that the restoration of Muslim law was not 
only limited to property rights, but also to some other matters. As this reform was 
meant for the entire Muslim community, another Act the Muslim Marriage 
Dissolution Act was passed in 1939, enacted to give more relief to Muslim women in 
the marital sphere. 
  
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 
 
The legal reform with the most significant impact on Muslim women’s rights was 
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the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1939. Modelled on the English 
Matrimonial Causes Acts, this allowed a Hanafi wife to obtain a judicial divorce on 
the standard grounds of cruelty, desertion, failure to maintain, etc. Despite the act, 
however, there was little improvement in the plight of Muslim women. Within 18 
months of the passing of the Muslim Personal Law Shariat Application Act 1937, 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 was passed. While passing the act, it 
was noted that the Hanafi code of Muslim law did not allow a Muslim woman to 
obtain a decree from the court dissolving her marriage in case the husband failed to 
maintain her, deserted her, maltreated her, or left her un-provided for. The act 
sought to bring together and consolidate all laws relating to the dissolution of 
marriage in order to help Muslim women. 
The introduction of this bill represented another attempt on the part of the 
Ulema to utilise the legislature to rectify the prevailing situation with regard to the 
rights of Muslim women when it came to dissolving their marriages. This concerned 
was for two reasons: first the Quran expressly permits the dissolution of a marriage 
by women in case of necessity (Mahmood, 1988), and second, the danger of losing 
numerical strength that was emerging from the women’s apostatising from Islam. 
These two factors led them to take action to rectify the situation so that the 
conversion could be stopped and women could get the right to dissolve their 
marriages not through the act of apostasy, but through the legal procedure.  
Major credit goes to Maulana Ashraf Thanavi, who wrote extensively about 
the rights of Muslim women. His writings were an important force in assembling 
the coalition that backed the legislation. To elaborate this, in 1913 Maulana 
Thanavi had issued a fatwa in a case involving a Muslim husband who had applied 
to a British court in India for restitution of conjugal rights. The wife’s family 
refused on the grounds that she had renounced Islam, and therefore, her marriage 
no longer remained valid. The judge asked the claimant to secure a fatwa clarifying 
this point in Islamic law, and Maulana Thanavi ruled that the marriage was indeed 
annulled as a result of the wife’s apostasy (Aasud et al. 1996; Thanavi nd). 
 
A brief note on the background of the Legislation  
 
A majority of Muslims in the subcontinent follow the Hanafi School of Islamic 
jurisprudence, which is the strictest in matters of divorce, and gives the wife almost 
no grounds for initiating the dissolution of her marriage. During this period, when 
Muslim women were converting to other religions, some Muslim jurists laid down 
the principle that the marriage would not be dissolved and the woman would be 
imprisoned till she returned to Islam. In British India, however, it was not possible 
to enforce this ruling: various rulings of the courts were based on the notion that if 
a Muslim woman refused to return to her faith, it would result in the dissolution of 
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her marriage. The situation became alarming during the early decades of the 20th 
century when the number of Muslim women who renounced Islam in order to secure 
judicial divorces increased exponentially. The latent impact of this act of apostasy, 
as visualised by political parties and community leaders, was the upcoming 
numerical imbalance. As stated earlier a show of numerical strength was to 
emphasize the importance of the community, and this trend was seen as a danger to 
group identity and cohesion. Growing apostasy was also said to be the result of the 
selfishness of Muslim men who denied their women the rights given to them by 
Islam, as Rashid-ul-Khairi pointed out.  
As a social reformer I tried my best to convince the Indian Muslims for the 
necessity of Khulah. But I never succeeded in my efforts. At last, when the time of 
decision of the suit of divorce of Qaisar (a daughter of one of my close friends) came, 
I went to the Kazi at the request of Qaisar’s father. The Kazi was my class fellow at 
school. By giving the reference of that friendship I requested the kazi to give Qaisar 
her Islamic right of Khulah. He (the Kazi) said to me that though ‘you are very right 
in your point of view but if I would give this right to Muslim women, the decision 
will destroy the whole Muslim society in India and thousands of married women 
will run away from their husband’s house. The obstinacy of the Kazi led Qaisar to 
change her religion. Her apostasy was declared in the supplement of Curzon 
Gazette which was published from Delhi at that time. ( Saimuddin and Khanam 
2002) 
This increase in apostasy was due to two reasons: first because many Muslim 
women found no other way to come out of cruel and abusive marriages, and second, 
to some extent, it was an impact of missionary activity. Muslim organizations and 
social reformers started thinking of ways and means to curb the tendency of 
renouncing Islam simply because religious law did not allow them to get rid of their 
husbands lawfully. This alarming situation was noticed by community leaders, 
scholars and ulemas. The famous poet Iqbal made an appeal to Muslim scholars to 
reform Hanafi law in order to find a solution within Islam for this problem, so that 
Muslim women would not have to take recourse to this desperate mode of dissolving 
their marriages (Masud1995:155-78). 
In 1913 Maulana Thanavi had consulted a number of other ulemas on the 
subject of his fatwa, including various Maliki ulemas in Arabia. In 1931 he issued a 
lengthy revision of his earlier fatwa: Al-hilat un-Najiza li’l-Halitat al-‘Ajiza (‘A 
Successful Legal Device for the Helpless Wife’) (http://dex 
1.tsd.unifi.it/juragentium/en/surveys/rol/minault.htm). He ruled that apostasy did 
not annul a Muslim marriage, but a wife might obtain a judicial divorce based on 
grounds permitted by the Maliki school of Muslim jurisprudence. This device of 
eclecticism (takhayyur) in jurisprudence recognized by some legal scholars and 
commentators, opened the way to a reform of Muslim divorce law. Maulana’s 
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opinion was seconded by the Jamat-e-Ulma-Hind. The issue of conversion was a 
challenge for the ulemas as well as the Jamiat-ul-Ulam-e-Hind. It is to be noted 
that in 1935 several bills were drafted by the Jamiat based on a book written by 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanavi with the help of other Maulanas. On the basis of the 
recommendation of the book, a Bill was introduced in the central legislature of 1936 
by Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi, a member of the central legislative assembly and the 
Jamiat, apart from being a lawyer from Merrut, which later on became the Muslim 
Dissolution of Marriage Act.  
The statement of Objects and Reasons (Gazette of India, Part V, 1936, p.154) 
attached to the bill gave several reasons for its introduction. The main reason was 
that the existing law had caused ‘unspeakable misery to innumerable Muslim 
women in British India’. In the Federal Assembly, the bill was described as being 
constituted of three parts: it gave grounds for the dissolution of marriage, described 
the effect of apostasy on the marriage tie, and provided for the authorised court 
personnel to dissolve a Muslim marriage. The bill clearly enlisted the grounds on 
which Muslim women could seek a divorce. 
The Muslim Marriage Bill was debated and enacted in 1939. It was 
specifically directed to benefit Muslim women and was compiled as an amalgam of 
the four schools of jurisprudence, picking the most liberal features from each of 
them.  
This bill was first referred to a Select Committee of which Muslims formed a 
majority, debated thoroughly in the assembly, and finally passed in 1939. The 
statement of objects of the bill was announced by Hussain Imam, M.L.A. from Bihar 
and Orissa. He pointed out: 
– There is no provision in the Hanafi Code of Muslim Law enabling a married 
Muslim woman to obtain a decree from the Court dissolving her marriage in case 
the husband neglects to maintain her, makes her life miserable by deserting or 
persistently maltreating her, or absconds, leaving her unprovided for and under 
certain other circumstances. The absence of such a provision has entailed 
unspeakable misery to innumerable Muslim women in British India. The Hanafi 
jurists, however, have clearly laid down that in cases in which the application of 
Hanafi law causes hardship, it is permissible to apply the provision of the Maliki, 
Shafi or Hanbali law. Acting on this principle, the Ulama had issued fatwa to the 
effect that in cases enumerated in clause 3, part A of this Bill, a married Muslim 
woman may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage. As the courts are sure to 
hesitate to apply the Maliki law to the case of Muslim women, legislation 
recognising and enforcing the above-mentioned principle is called for in order to 
relieve the suffering of countless Muslim women.  
The courts in British India had held in a number of cases that the apostasy of 
married Muslim woman dissolves her marriage. This view has been repeatedly 
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(expressed) at the bar, but the courts continue to stick to precedents created by 
rulings based on an erroneous view of the Muslim law. The Ulama have issued 
fatawa supporting non-dissolution of marriage by reason of wife’s apostasy. The 
Muslim community has, again and again, given expression to its supreme 
dissatisfaction with the view held by the courts. Thus, by this bill the whole law 
relating to the dissolution of marriage is brought at one place and consolidated in 
the hope that it would supply a very long-felt desire of the Muslim community in 
India. (Government of India, Legal Department Record, 1938, L/p & J/7/1839). 
 
In proposing the Bill, Ahmad Kazmi said,  
– The reason for proceeding with the bill is the great trouble in which I find 
women in India today. Their condition is really heartrending, and to stay any longer 
without the provisions of the bill and allow the males to continue to exercise their 
rights and to deprive women of their rights given to them by religion would not be 
justifiable– the rights of women should not be jeopardized simply because they are 
not represented in this house. I am sure if we had a single properly educated 
Muslim woman here in this house, then absolutely different ideas would have been 
expressed on the floor of this house. I know, sir that the demand from educated 
Muslim women is becoming more and more insistent, that their rights be conceded 
to them according to Islamic law–. – I think a Muslim woman must be given full 
liberty, full right to exercise her choice in matrimonial matters. (Legislative 
Assembly Debates 1939:616). 
The Act permitted the wife to seek a judicial divorce on grounds permitted by 
the Malikis, including the husbands’ cruelty, insanity, impotence, disappearance or 
imprisonment, and his failure to perform his marital obligations or provide 
maintenance for specified periods of time, ranging from two to seven years. The Act 
also provided for divorce based on the ‘option of puberty’, that is, if a woman had 
been married off by her elders before puberty and the marriage had not been 
consummated, she could ask for its dissolution.  Sir Zaffarullah Khan stated that 
the outstanding merit of this Bill was that it provided various grounds on which 
divorce could be obtained by a woman under Muslim law in very definite, clear and 
precise terms, and any judge, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, would not have much 
room left for doubt with regard to them. 
 
Debates on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act VIII of 1939   
  
Before 1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married under the 
Muslim law ipso facto dissolved the marriage, with the result that if a married 
Muslim woman changed her religion, she was free to marry a person professing her 
new religion. This was the rule of law enforced by the courts, throughout India at 
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any rate, for the last 60 years.  
 
This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939, Section 4 of which reads as follows: 
– The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to 
a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage: 
Provided that after such renunciation or conversion the woman shall be 
entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of marriage on any of the grounds 
mentioned in section 2: 
Provided further that the provision of' this section shall not apply to a woman 
converted to Islam from some other faith who re-embraces her former faith. 
According to this Act, Muslim woman’s marriage is not dissolved by her 
conversion to another religion. All that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very 
interesting to find that Section 2 does not refer to conversion or apostasy as grounds 
for divorce. The effect of the law is that a married Muslim woman has no liberty of 
conscience, and is tied for ever to her husband whose religious faith may be quite 
abhorrent to her. 
The grounds urged in support of this change are worth noting. The mover of 
the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L.A. adopted a very ingenious line of argument in support 
of the change. In his speech on the motion to refer the Bill he said: 
– Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by any other religion, as a great 
crime, almost amounting to a crime against the State. It is not novel for the religion 
of' Islam to have that provision. If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we will 
find that similar provision also exists in other Codes as well. For the male a severer 
punishment was awarded, that of death, and for females, only the punishment of 
imprisonment was awarded. This main provision was that because it was a sin, it 
was a crime, it was to be punished, and the woman was to be deprived of her status 
as wife. It was not only this status that she lost, but she lost all her suit as in 
society; she was deprived of her property and civil rights as well. But we find that 
as early as 1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste Disabilities Removal Act 
of 1850, Act XXI of 1850–. 
– by this Act, the forfeiture of civil rights that could be imposed on a woman 
on her apostasy has been taken away. She can no longer be subjected to any 
forfeiture of properly or her right of inheritance or anything of the kind. The only 
question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it has given her a certain 
amount of liberty of thought, some kind of liberty of religion to adopt any faith she 
likes, and has removed the forfeiture clause from which she could suffer, and which 
was a restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far we are entitled 
after that to continue placing the restriction on her status as a wife. Her status as a 
wife is of some importance in society. She belongs to some family, she has got 
children, she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind, she may 
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not like to continue the same old religion. If she changes her religion, why should 
we, according to our modern ideas, inflict upon her a further penalty that she will 
cease to be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we are advocating 
freedom of thought and freedom of religion, when we are advocating inter-marriages 
between different communities, it would be inconsistent for us to support a 
provision that a mere change of faith or change of religion would entail forfeiture of 
her rights as the wife of her husband. So, from a modern point of view, I have got no 
hesitation in saying that we cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition 
that apostasy must be allowed to finish her relationship with her husband. But that 
is only one part of the argument. 
Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, is to the effect that a 
married woman may sue for divorce on the grounds 'that the defendant has ceased 
to be a Parsi....' 
There are two things apparent from this. the first is, that it is a ground for 
dissolution, not from any religious idea or religious sentiment, because, if two years 
have passed after the conversion and if plaintiff does not object, then either the 
male or female has no right to sue for dissolution of marriage. The second thing is 
that it is the plaintiff who has got the complaint that the other party has changed 
the religion, who has got the right of getting the marriage dissolved–. In addition to 
this Act, as regards other communities we can have an idea of the effect of 
conversion on marriage tie from the Native Converts' Marriage Dissolution Act, Act 
XXI of 1886– It applies to all the communities of India, and this legislation 
recognises the fact that mere conversion of an Indian to Christianity would not 
dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a law court and saying 
that the other party, who is not converted, must perform the marital duties in 
respect of him– then they are given a year's time and the judge directs that they 
shall have an interview with each other in the presence of certain other persons to 
induce them to resume their conjugal relationship, and if they do not agree, then on 
the ground of desecration the marriage is dissolved. The marriage is dissolved no 
doubt, but not on the ground of change of faith– So, every community in India has 
got this accepted principle that conversion to another religion cannot amount to 
dissolution of marriage. (Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. V,pp. 1098-1101). 
Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member of the Assembly and a 
protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank. In support of the principle of the Bill he 
said: 
– For a very long lime the courts in British India have held without 
reservation and qualification that under all circumstances apostasy automatically 
and immediately puts an end to the married state without any judicial proceedings, 
any decree of court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which was 
taken up by the Courts. Now, there are three distinct views of Hanafi jurists on the 
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point. One view which is attributed to the Bokhara jurists was adopted and even 
that not in its entirely but in what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition. 
What that Bokhara view is has been already stated by Mr. Kazmi and some other 
speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I 
should be more accurate in saying—1 have got authority for that—that it is, 
according to the Bokhara view, not dissolved but suspended. The marriage is 
suspended but the wife is then kept in custody or confinement till she repents and 
embraces Islam again, and then she is induced to marry the husband, whose 
marriage was only suspended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view is 
that on apostasy a married Muslim woman ceases to be the wife other husband but 
becomes his bond woman. One view, which is a sort of corollary to this view, is that 
she is not necessarily the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond 
woman of the entire Muslim community and anybody can employ her as a bond 
woman. The third view that is of the Ulema of Samarkand and Baikh, is that the 
marriage tie is not affected by such apostasy and that the woman still continues to 
be the wife of the husband. These are the three views. A portion of the first view, 
the Bokhara view, was taken hold of by the Courts and rulings after rulings were 
based on that portion. 
This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary instance that 
judicial error is sought to be corrected by legislation, but in many other cases, too, 
there have been judicial errors or conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties and 
vagueness of law. Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by 
legislation. In this particular matter there has been an error after error and a 
tragedy of errors. To show me those rulings is begging the question. Surely, it 
should be realized that it is no answer to my Bill that because the High Courts have 
decided against me, I have no business to come to this House and ask it to legislate 
this way or that way.(Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. V, pp. 1953-55)  
During the course of debate, Mr. M.S. Aney, a member from Berar, pointed 
out that by using the legislature to reform Muslim law, the law was being 
secularised and government courts should therefore be allowed to judge cases; there 
was thus no need for a special Kazi, as had been proposed (Legislative Assemble 
Debates 1939: 868). 
The only woman member of the Assembly, Mrs. Radhabai Subaroyan, in her 
support of the bill pointed out, 
– Mr. Deputy President, I rise with pleasure to support the motion moved by 
my honourable friend, Mr. Kazmi. I feel this bill recognizes the principles of 
equality between men and women. It has been stated here and outside that though 
Islamic law lays down this principle, in actual practice in several parts of our 
country, it is ignored to the disadvantage of women. It is heartening…to hear my 
Muslim colleagues condemn this state of affairs and advocate that justice should be 
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done to women and that women should have the rights to claim divorce on the same 
terms as men– it definitely raises the status of women and recognizes their 
individuality and–human personality’. (Legislative Assembly Debates 1939:881) 
However, the ulemas were not comfortable with the proposed Bill, 
particularly Clause Vl which says:  
–  that suits of the dissolution of marriage on the part of Muslim women 
should be held in proper courts under the supervision of Muslim judges and, when 
the presiding officer was not Muslim, the suit should be passed from one place to 
another until it could find a Muslim official. After the decision, the suit would then 
be referred back to the original court. In the case of appeals against the decision of 
the trial court, people would have to look to the high court and their cases should be 
heard and decided again by a Muslim judge. 
They felt that the Act differed in several respects from the recommendations 
of the Ulema. Most important was not reserving jurisdiction in cases of Muslim 
divorce to Muslim judges alone. It was also made to apply to all Muslims–not only 
Sunnis, but Shias as well. Consequently, Maulana Thanavi and the other divines 
who had originally urged for the reform of the divorce law were displeased with the 
Act in its final form, and condemned the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Act as un-
Islamic (Masud1971:251-97). They were afraid of religious freedom and the 
imposition of artificial arrangements from a foreign government. This feeling arose 
after the ruling of various courts in British India, which in turn strengthened the 
idea that the enforcement of Muslim Family Law could not be accomplished without 
the appointment of Muslim authorities in such institutions. They, particularly the 
jamait- ul-Ulama-i- Hind blamed the member of Muslim League legislature for the 
enactment of such ‘Un-Islamic measures on Muslim. However, it seems that the 
basic reason for blaming the Muslim League was political rivalry, mainly the 
leadership of Jinnah, who had a progressive outlook on the matter of legal reforms 
(Mahmood, 1995:58). Besides this, many fatwas were issued during the period, 
arguing that if a non-Muslim could not perform the ceremony of Muslim Nikah, 
there was simply no way in which he could be justified in dissolving a Muslim 
marriage. 
Nevertheless, some of the members of legislature reacted to the objection and 
gave their views on the difficulty in implementing the clause in the Bill. Mr. J.A. 
Thorne (Nominated Member of the Government of India) pointed out that ‘the 
difficulty of implementation of this clause will arise in those provinces where the 
number of Muslim judges in particular and Muslims in general was small. In such 
circumstances the enforcement of the Act would not be advantageous (Legislative 
Assembly Debates, Seventh Session of the Fifth Legislative Assembly, 31 January 
to 22 February 1938:319). 
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Sardar Sant Singh, M.L.A. from west Punjab, while giving his reaction to this bill 
stated, 
– The proposal for such communal tribunals would only show distrust of 
judges of communities other than one’s own in the matter of administration of 
personal laws introduce a narrow mentality that should be avoided at all costs’ 
(ibid. 626). He further criticised those members of assembly who demanded that the 
matter be removed from civil courts and handled over to courts that were presided 
over by one community, on the grounds that it was akin to introducing the principle 
of imperium in imperio1 (ibid). 
M.S.Aney, M.L.A. from Berar, was of the same opinion and said that ‘since it 
was a matter of the administration of justice, it could be accomplished by relying 
upon men, irrespective of religious background, who had been recruited according to 
the true spirit of law and in the best interests of people’ (ibid:320). The Law 
member, Sir Nirpendra Sircar, enumerated the administrative difficulties that were 
likely to arise if it was accepted that only a Muslim could dissolve a Muslim 
marriage. He further objected to the clause in principle, as it amounted to casting 
aspersions on the judicial honesty of the judges (Legislative Assembly Debates, 
V.9.No.ix, p. 1954). 
From evaluation of all debates that took place in support of the bill it can be 
concluded that all legal arguments put forth by supporters of the bill, particularly 
the two parties the unionist party and the Jamat-ul- e-Hind had little to do with 
improving the status of Muslim women. Rather the intention to support the bill had 
more to do with putting a stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths, 
which were usually followed by immediate and hurried marriages with someone 
from the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to locking her in the new 
community and preventing her from returning to the one to which she originally 
belonged. The conversion of a Muslim woman to Hinduism and of a Hindu woman 
to Islam was not only looked at from social and political points of view, but also 
from the point of view of the long term consequences this conversion would have on 
the numerical strength of the communities. In other words, it was feared that this 
could create a disturbance in the numerical balance between the two communities, 
which s what they were more concerned about. The abduction of women had created 
disturbances that could not be overlooked. These conversions and the women’s 
subsequent marriages were therefore rightly regarded as a series of depredations 
practised by Hindus against Muslims and vice-versa.  
The above observation is made on the basis of the two provisions to Section 4 
of this Act. In proviso I the Hindus concede to the Musalmans that if they convert a 
woman who was originally a Muslim, she will remain bound to her former Muslim 
                                                 
1The term refers to sovereignty to issue commands as an uncontested imperial command which is 
externally unconstrained, and binding on people who constitute community.  
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husband, notwithstanding her conversion. Through proviso 2 the Muslims concede 
to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married woman and she is married to a 
Musalman, her marriage will be deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and 
she will be free to return to her Hindu fold. Thus, what underlies the change in law 
is the desire to retain the numerical balance, and it is for this purpose that the 




Looking at the overall situation in which these Acts were passed and the whole 
social process that was involved, no doubt, that legislation was considered an urgent 
necessity to protect women from the existing social and customary practices that 
had made women’s lives miserable.  But if we see the whole debate for the demand 
of these laws by the Muslim leaders, however, we find that the question of 
community/religious identity overrode the question of gender identity.  
As far as the framework of Islamic doctrine is concerned, religious symbolism 
was interpreted to a large extent to match existing perceptions about the status of 
women, while legislation was used as a means to help women regain the rights that 
the Shariat had given them. Although the community supported the legislation, it 
realised that Muslim women’s interests would be best served by the restoration of 
rights under the Shariat. However, efforts to restore these rights were played out 
between the government, ulemas, representatives of both community-based political 
groups and women’s organizations, and in all this the pressure of community 
politics had always been an important factor. 
The ulemas were afraid of religious freedom and the imposition of artificial 
arrangements from a foreign government, and considered themselves the sole 
custodians of the Shariat and advocators of women’s rights (this trend is still found. 
For instance, the role and interference of the members of All India Muslim Personal 
Law Board on the issues related to women’s Islamic rights and its claim as being 
the custodian of Muslim Personal law as well as the Muslim community).  
The role of reformers has very much been a part of community-based politics 
irrespective of religion, since the reform movement tended to focus on specific 
aspects of the community’s regional customs and traditions vis-a-vis women.  
The legislators seemed more concerned about the dangers of the Muslims 
losing their solidarity and national unity, and with them showing numerical 
strength for political purposes. Jinnah, for instance, demanded amendment during 
the assembly debate on Shariat Bill wanted to change the wording to ‘custom and 
usage’ only, implying that prior legislation would be upheld even when it clashed 
with the rights of women.  
 
 39 
Reformers also used women’s issues to challenge the existing social structure, and 
claimed the colonial government’s support by organizing a show of numerical 
strength to buttress their claims. The political parties provided a platform for both 
proponents and opponents of reform, so that henceforth debates for and against it 
were conducted more or less within party confines. Women were encouraged to 
participate in party activities, thus further internalising the debate.  For instance, 
for those attacking the colonial regime from an Islamic perspective, the question of 
female inheritance was an ideological issue of prime importance. As a political 
issue, this question was for many reformers central to the formation of Muslim 
solidarity.  
Thus the question of improving the status of women and making the laws 
more gender just by giving them a share in inheritance, the issue was concerned 
more with the ideology and group solidarity/ identity. Moreover, the focus shifted 
and women’s interests were squarely placed in the political arena, subject to debate 
and political manoeuvring, which exists even today.  
As far as women’s organizations and women leaders were concerned, they did 
formulate an agenda and lobbied the government and political parties without 
reference to community or caste politics and the best result one could find the 
commencement of Child Marriage Restraint Act in which gender identity overrode 
the community identity. But the divisiveness of Indian politics and its polarisation 
on religious lines meant that legislative changes were loaded with claims and 
counter-claims made by competing community interests, which all but submerged 
the real problems confronting women.  
It would be worth mentioning at this point that in Ataturk's Turkey and the 
Shah's Iran it was women who put in motion the strategy through which the society 
was altered. The liberal laws concerning women in Turkey date from 1926, and the 
Kemalist strategies for women’s advancement are well-known and form the 
cornerstone of Turkish Westernization, while symbolizing its separation from 
Islamic culture. Here, in undivided India, we also find the theme of unveiling of 
women, not as the result of their own struggle for emancipation, but as a sign of 
apostasy and community identity. And this strategy is inextricably tied to that of 
the construction of a new political order and a new state.  
Thus legal reforms were in a sense a logical extension of men’s concerns to 
improve women’s status and adherence to the faith of Islam. Women were symbolic 
of what men wanted their community to be. Women, when consulted, were expected 
to agree. Concerns for Muslim women’s rights as individuals were another matter.  
The main concern of the reformers, whether in India or elsewhere, was ‘with 
establishing norms for community behaviour, and in the process, establishing an 
irreducible Muslim identity within the political process’ (Minault,1981:11). In fact, 
the quest for identity is not an ideological creation of fundamentalists: its origins– 
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and its legitimacy– lie in national and communal demands for independence, liberty 
or equality, hijacked by states and political powers, whether in colonial situations 
(Algeria), under the weight of imperialism (Iran), or among national minorities 
(India, Sri Lanka and numerous African countries).  
Though both the Acts were apparently in the interests of women, they 
retained male privilege in matters like divorce or inheritance. The scene has 
remained unchanged as is evident from the case of Shah Bano and the subsequent 
passing of Muslim Women Act of 1986. The only difference is that women’s 
movements in pre-independence India were about removing legal disabilities and 
bringing in social reforms, and were initiated by men who, under the influence of 
Western liberal ideas, worked against repressive social norms like child marriage, 
widow remarriage, sati and purdah, and demanded new legislation to remove legal 
disabilities faced by women irrespective of religion. The main concern of pre-
independence women’s movements was with eradicating illiteracy among women 
and bringing them out of the house to participate in the national movement. They 
did not question patriarchy or the gender-based division of labour. This period of 
the women’s movement was marked by the convergence of women's issues across 
the boundaries of religion and focused more on similarities than on differences, 
while the post-independence women’s movement demanded gender equality, 
questioned the gender-based division of labour, and highlighted the oppressive 
nature of the existing patriarchal structure irrespective of religious boundaries. 
However, with the passing of the Muslim Women Act of 1986, due to the vested 
interests of various political parties and the so-called community leaders, the 
question of minority identities overrode the real concerns of women (which aspect I 
am not going to discuss here). Muslim women were, to a large extent, affected by 
this divisive environment. While the religious fundamentalists/ Ulemas tried to 
place the onus of preserving religio-cultural identity on women, the political parties 
played the politics of proving numerical strength for gaining political power. In this 
process maintaining community identity and political power the real concern of 
women and social justice somehow took back seat. This position of the reformers, 
Ulemas and the political leaders, diverted their main concern of improving women 
status and giving proper attention to the grim realities, problems of Muslim women 
and the deviations from the actual Islamic position. More or less same position is 
existing today as far as the rights of Muslim women in India are concerned. The 
ulemas are more concerned for strengthening the community identity by depriving 
women from their Islamic rights in matrimonial matters. For instance, the Muslim 
women of Uttar Pradesh, a northern province in India are still guided by the UP 
Zamidari Act of 1952 in which they are not entitled to inherit agricultural land but 
neither the member of All India Personal Law Board nor any political leader from 
that area ever rose this issue that it is against the Islamic Shariah. Further, the 
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enactment of the Muslim women Act 1986 with the vested political interest of the 
ruling party and the role of All India Personal law Board went against the secular 
rights of Muslim women in matter. Despite the efforts made by various secular 
women’s organizations, the act was passed and Muslim women were debarred from 
claiming maintenance under the 125 Cr pc, which was their right as citizen of the 
country. These two examples clearly shows the concerns which the so-called 
custodian of Muslim community and the political parties have for Muslim women in 
India after 58 years of Independence. 
And to me, this seems to be the biggest challenge as well as dilemma for 
women’s movement, which being a secular movement, is in a–fix as to ‘how to 
assimilate Muslim women's issues into broader issues of women’s movement and, at 
the same time, safeguard their religious and cultural identity. This has been most 
obvious in the case of Muslim Personal Law/uniform civil code. Placing Muslim 
women's issues within the confines of religion has further marginalised them, and 
created hesitancy among the secular feminists in addressing their problems for fear 
of hurting religious sentiments’ (Bhatty2003). However, the reality that women’s 
rights within the family were subjected to public debates in both the pre and post 
independence periods consolidated the position of Muslim women and their 





Anderson, J.N.D., 1959.(ed) Islamic Law in the Modern World, New York 
University Press, New York. 
 
Ashraf Ali Thanavi, Imdad ul-Fatwa, Ma’ruf be Fatwa-i-Ashrafiya (Deoband, nd) pp 
407-19. 
 
Andrews, C.F., The True India, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939. 
 
Azra Asghar Ali., 2000. The Emergence of Feminism among Indian Muslim Women 
1920-1947 Oxford University Press. 
  
Begum Shaista Ikramulla, 1963, From Purdah to Parliament, Cresset Press, 
London,P 87. 
 
Bhatty Z ., ‘Feminists or reformists’? The Hindu, March 16, 2003. 
 
Caton, A.R., 1930. The Key of Progress, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Everett J., 978. Women and Social Change in India Heritage New Delhi. 
 
Faruqi Z., 1963. The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, Asia Publishing 
House Bombay.  
 
Fyzee A A., 1974. An Outline of Mohammdan Law, Oxford University Press Delhi 
p.15. 
 
Gazette of India, Part V, 1936, p.154. 
 
Ghadially, R., 1996.  
 
Geraldine Forbes., 1981. ‘The Indian Women’s Movement: A Struggle for Women’s 
Rights or National Liberation?’ In Gail Menault (ed) The Extended Family, 
Chanakya Publication Delhi,p.63. 
 
Gilmartin David., 1981. ‘Kinship, Women, and Politics in Twentieth Century 




Http://dex1.tsd.unifi.it/juragentium/en/surveys/rol/minault.htm ‘A Successful Legal 




Khalid M Aasud, Brinkely Messick and David S. Powers 1996 (eds) Islamic Legal 
Interpretation. Muftis and their Fatwas, Cambridge MA, pp 193-203. 
  
Khalid Masud, 1995 ‘Apostasy and Judicial Separation; Idem., Iqbal’s 
Reconstruction of Ijtihad  Lahore cf. Furqan Ahmad, Contribution of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanavi to the Protection and Development of Islamic 
law in the Indian Subcontinent’ Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly, 6, 
1, March 1986 pp.71-9. 
 
Lateef Shahida., 1990. Muslim Women in India, Kali for Women; New Delhi, p.62. 
 
Lateef Shahida., 1994. ‘Defining women through legislation’ In Zoya Hasan (ed) 
Forging Identities; Kali for women, New Delhi. 
 
Legal Disabilities of Indian Women, Renuka Ray, reprint from MR (November 
1934); ‘women’s Movement in India’, Manchester Guradian, (August 15, 
1935), AIWC Files no. 84). 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates 1937; 1427-287). 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates 1937; 1427-287). 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates 1937; 1430). 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates 1939:1854. 
 
Legislative Assembly debates 1939; 1832. 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates, 1939 1823-4. 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates, Seventh Session of the Fifth Legislative Assembly, 
31st January to 22nd February 1938.p.319. 
 
Legislative Assembly Debates, V, 9. ix.38, p 1954. 
 
 44 
Legislative Assembly Debates, V: 9. ix.37, pp 1443-44. 
 
Mahmood T., Muslim personal law: The Role of the State in the Subcontinent, Vikas 
New Delhi. 
 
Mahmood, Tahir., 1995. Statute-Law Relating to Muslims in India, Institute of 
Objective Studies, New Delhi. 
 
Masud, M. Khalid, ‘Apostasy’ the text of the law is contained in B.R. Verma, 
Muslim marriage and dissolution Allahabad, 1971; pp 251-97). 
 
Meherally, yusuf., 1947. At the Crossroads, The National Information and 
Publications, Bombay, pp 90-92. 
 
Minault G., 1982. ‘Purdah Politics: The Role of Muslim Women in Indian 
Nationalism, 1911-1924’ in Hanna Pappanek and Minault, G. (Edited) 
Separate Worlds: Studies of Purdah in South Asia Chanakya Publications, 
New Delhi. 
 
Minault, G., 1981. ‘Sisterhood or Separatism: The All India Muslim Ladies 
Conference and the Nationalist Movement’ in G. Minault (edited), The 
Extended Family: Women and Political Participation in India and Pakistan, 
Chanakya Publications, New Delhi. 
 
Mumtaz, K. and Shaheed, F., 1987. Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One 
Step Back? London: Zed. 
 
Prashar Archana., 1992. Women and Family Law Reform in India, Sage Publication 
New Delhi. 
 
Proceedings of the All India Muslim League sixth Session, Patna in sharfudding 
Pirzada edited Foundation of Pakistan, vol.11, p. 318). 
 
Punjab Legislative Council Debates, Vol.19 (1931), pp. 788-792: Vol. 20 (1931), pp. 
61-78, 120-133, 183-205 
 
Quyum Naveen., 2003 ‘women’s Movement in South Asia’,  
 http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00004446&channel=gulberg). 
 
Rashida Patel., 1979.Women and Law in Pakistan, Faiza Publishers Karachi, p.8. 
 45 
 
Ray, Renuka., All India Women’s Conference  Files no. 84, February, 1946, Roshini 
Publication. 
 
Report of The Age of Consent Committee 1928-29, Government of India, Central 
Publication Branc, 1929 p.12. 
 
Robinson,F.C.R., 1974. Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the 
United Provinces, 1860-1923, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Roshini, Publication of the All India Women’s Conference; Feb 1946 No.1 p.4. 
 
Saimuddin Abida R. Khanam., 2002.(ed) Muslim Feminism and Feminist 
Movement vol. 1 Global vision Publishing House, Delhi 
 
The N.W.F.P.Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application bill 1934). Introduced in 
the Legislative Council of N.W.F.P., See Notification No.732 L.C. dated 29 
March 1934, L/P&J/7/667, pp.1-2, (IOL). 
 






THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW (SHARIAT)  
APPLICATION ACT, 1937 




An Act to make provision for the application of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) to 
Muslims 2[***] 
WHEREAS it is expedient to make provision for the application of the Muslim Personal 
Law (Shariat) to Muslims 2[***]; 
It is hereby enacted as follows: 
  
1. Short title and extent 
    (1) This Act may be called the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. 
    (2) It extends to 3[the whole of India 4[except the State of Jammu and Kashmir]] 5[***] 6 
 
2. Application of Personal Law to Muslims 
Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions 
relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of females, 
including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other 
provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, 
lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust 
properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and 
religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be 
the Muslim Personal law (Shariat). 
 
3. Power to make a declaration 
    (1) Any person who satisfies the prescribed authority- 
        (a)that he is a Muslim, and 
        (b)that he is competent to contract within the meaning of section 11 of the   
             Indian Contract Act, 1872, and 
        (c)that he is a resident of 6[the territories to which this Act extends] 
            may by declaration in the prescribed form and filed before the prescribed  
authority declare that he  desires to obtain the benefit of 7[the provisions of this 
section], and thereafter the provisions of    
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            section 2 shall apply to the declarant and all his minor children and their 
descendants as if in addition to the matters enumerated therein adoption, wills and 
legacies were also specified. 
     
     (2) Where the prescribed authority refuses to accept a declaration under sub-section  
     (1), the person desiring to make the same may appeal to such officer as the 8[State] 
Government may, if he is satisfied that the appellant is entitled to make the 
declaration, order the prescribed authority to   
           accept the same. 
4. Rule-making power 
    (1)    The 8[State] Government may make rules to carry into effect the purposes of this 
Act. 
    (2)   In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such 
rules may provide for all or any of the following maters, namely:- 
          (a) for prescribing the authority before whom and the form in which declarations   
   under this Act shall be made; 
          (b) for prescribing the fees to be paid for the filing of declaration and for the  
    attendance at private residences of any person in the discharge of his duties    
    under this Act; and for prescribing the times at which such fees shall be payable 
and the manner in which they shall be levied 
    (3)  Rules made under the provisions of this section shall be published in the Official 
Gazette and shall  thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act. 
 
[5. Dissolution of marriage by Court in certain circumstances- Repealed by the Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939]  
 
6. Repeals 
9[The under mentioned provisions] of the Acts and Regulations mentioned below shall be 
repealed in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, namely:- 
    (1) Section 26 of the Bombay Regulation IV of 1827; 
    (2) Section 16 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873;      
       10[***] 
    (4) Section 3 of the Oudh Laws Act, 1876; 
    (5) Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872; 
    (6) Section 5 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875; and 
    (7) Section 4 of the Ajmer Laws Regulation, 1877. 
  
Foot Notes 
1.  This Act has been amended in Madras by Madras Act 18 of 1949. 
2.  The words "in the Provinces of India" omitted by the A.O. 1950. 
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3.  Substituted by the A.O. 1950, for the words "all the Provinces of India". 
4. Substituted by the Miscellaneous Personal Laws, (Extension) Act, 1959, w.e.f. 1st.     
February, 1960. 
5.  The words "excluding the North-West Frontier Province" omitted by the Indian     
Independence (Adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinances) Order, 1948. 
 In its application to Pondicherry, in section 1, after sub-section (2), the following shall 
be inserted- 
Provided that nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the Renoncants of the Union 
territory of   Pondicherry."-(Vide Act 26 of 1968). 
6.  Substituted by the Adaptation of Laws (No.3) Order, 1956, for the words "a Part A State 
or a Part C State". 
7.  Substituted by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Act, 1943 
(16 of 1943), for the words "this Act". 
8.  Substituted by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950, for the words "Provincial". 
9.  Substituted by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Act, 1943, 
for the words   "Provisions". 
10. The brackets, figures and words "(3) Section 37 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil 
Courts Act, 1887" omitted by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application 
(Amendment) Act, 1943. This omission has the effect of reviving the operation of section 
37 of that Act. 
    
* * * 
